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ABSTRACT 
The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War:  
The Impact of International Intervention in a Regional Conflict  
Jeffrey Scott Passage 
 
 This thesis examines the role of international intervention in the area formerly known as 
Yugoslavia during its collapse in the first half of the 1990s (1991-1995).  The Cold War had just 
ended, and the United Nations (UN), NATO, and the nations they represented were reevaluating 
their roles in a world without competition between two superpowers.  The collapse of 
Yugoslavia and ensuing civil war presented these international bodies with an opportunity to 
intervene and show that they were ready to take charge in future conflicts in pursuing and 
achieving peace.  However, what followed revealed them to be short-sighted and ill-prepared for 
this role as the conflict quickly escalated leading to genocide again taking place in Europe.   
 The country of Bosnia, which emerged as its own nation in the collapse of Yugoslavia, 
will receive special interest due to its place as the geographic and active center of most of the 
war and atrocities.  The United States will also be examined in detail since it eventually played a 
key role in achieving peace with the Dayton Peace Accords.   
 The purpose of this study was to determine whether the intervention in Bosnia and former 
Yugoslavia was implemented well.  After examining primary documents from the United States, 
the UN, NATO and other organizations, as well as secondary documents in the form of journal 
articles and books, it became clear that the intentions of these groups were good, but their 
abilities in achieving peace were not.  Many leaders were highly influenced by prior experiences 
in either World War II or Vietnam which made it difficult for them to see this new conflict in a 
different light.  Thus, it was only when key figures in leadership changed that the situation in 
Bosnia was turned around and peace became attainable.  Unfortunately, this peace was only 
achieved after hundreds of thousands had died and millions had been displaced creating a 
difficult rebuilding and reunifying process for those that remained or returned following Dayton. 
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“Those who practice diplomacy need constantly to be reminded of the human damage their 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Agression is the name we give to the crime of war.  We know the crime because of our 
knowledge of the peace it interrupts—not the mere absence of fighting, but peace-with-
rights, a condition of liberty and security that can exist only in the absence of aggression 
itself.  The wrong the aggressor commits is to force men and women to risk their lives for 
the sake of their rights.  It is to confront them with the choice: your rights or (some of) 
your lives!1 – Michael Walzer 
 
 The country of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia) is a young and predominantly unknown 
nation in the United States.  It lies to the east of the Adriatic Sea and is made up of slightly less 
acreage than the state of West Virginia.  Despite its small size, Bosnia became the focus of the 
world’s attention between 1992 and 1995 as forces conspired to destroy its multiethnic 
configuration.  This led to the international community inserting itself into the ordeal in order to 
try to stop the bloodshed, and it set the stage for the United Nations, NATO, the United States, 
and the European Community (EU) to reevaluate their roles following the end of the Cold War.  
Far from a perfect intervention, the ensuing war and peace negotiations revealed the weaknesses 
of international intervention as negotiations floundered and hundreds of thousands of Bosnians 
died.  This paper will critique the responses of the UN, NATO, and the U.S. to the collapse of 
Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia in order to facilitate a better understanding of what went 
wrong.  The intervention was largely a failed effort with success only coming four years after the 
war began, and it took a number of changes in leadership and tactics along with a major tragedy 
in order to achieve that success. 
Intervention by the international community under the United Nations and NATO in the 
Bosnian War has been viewed as a major success for those who helped end the violence.  
However, the United Nations failed to act quickly, and severely, in punishing the aggressors of 
the conflict.  Failing to do so allowed the situation to whirl out of control and genocide once 
                                                 
1
 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (New York: 
Basic Books, 2006), 51. 
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again took place on European soil.  A general lack of understanding of the differing cultures 
represented by the opposing sides of the conflict also led to many poor decisions being made 
throughout the process.  Peace was achieved, but the cost was high to the inhabitants of all the 
republics of former Yugoslavia, and especially Bosnia, due to the wavering which took place on 
the part of the international community.  This is why the United States and its international allies 
in the UN and NATO must not linger only on the good that came out of the conflict.  Their 
successes, as well as their failures, must be investigated in order to ensure that any future 
conflicts like this one will not share the same fate.   
The first focus of this paper will be to examine the role of the international community in 
its attempt to bring peace to the region.  Despite eventually achieving peace, the process by 
which that peace was achieved was riddled with mistakes over far too long a period of time.  
Promises were made and broken.  Aggressors were rewarded to the bereavement of their victims.  
Even the final peace which was achieved at the Dayton Peace Accords in December of 1995 can 
be scrutinized for allowing some of the greatest protagonists of the violence a seat at the table 
adding legitimacy to their rule despite the crimes that had been perpetrated under their 
leadership.  Therefore the international community, especially the members of the United 
Nations, holds some responsibility for what transpired in former Yugoslavia.  The greatest 
tragedy is that they had the power to act and while they eventually achieved great success, they 
did not respond soon enough. 
Secondly, there will be a focus on the role of the United States and the way in which its 
leadership in the 1990s handled intervention.  The collapse and beginning of hostilities in 
Yugoslavia began during President George H.W. Bush’s tenure in office and continued into Bill 
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Clinton’s—making it a relevant topic of debate during the 1992 election and in each of the 
administrations.  Thus, both administrations must be examined carefully.   
The U.S. was also in a unique position following the end of the Cold War.  The buildup 
of arms during the Cold War had given the U.S. great military might and a huge international 
presence.  In addition, this was the first instance in which a regional conflict in Europe was 
spiraling out of control, and the European members of the UN desired to take the lead.  Both 
presidents of the U.S. were willing to yield to Europe in this situation since the U.S. no longer 
possessed any national interests in former Yugoslavia outside of those it shared with the UN in 
keeping the general peace.  However, prior to the Cold War ending the situation might have 
looked different as Yugoslavia had previously been of great interest to the U.S. as a Communist 
nation that had chosen not to align with Stalin or his Soviet heirs.  But the collapse of the Soviet 
Union took away that one advantage it held, thus, lessening U.S. interest.   
Grace must also be given to the international community.  The situation was more 
complicated than do something or do nothing.  The Cold War had just ended.  The United States 
and other Western powers were redefining their functions without the existence of a second 
superpower in the world.  Getting involved with a conflict, especially an overseas one could be 
politically dangerous, and there were many other complexities involved.  However, the fact 
remained that war in Yugoslavia was in no person or country’s best interest, least of all the 
citizens of the six republics.  Therefore, more attention should have been given to the events 
leading up to the war in the form of diplomacy and ensuring different voices would be heard in 
order to try to stave off disaster.   
In summary, the Bosnian War and its conclusion have been viewed as a major success for 
those who mediated and helped end the violence.  Nevertheless, the errors made should not be 
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excluded from the record by what was ultimately accomplished with the end of the war.  
Mistakes were made, and it is the responsibility of the nations which ultimately helped end the 
war to recognize those mistakes and learn from them in order to ensure that history does not 
repeat itself again.  Thus, this paper will stand as a testament to the successes and failures of the 
international community, and specifically the UN and U.S., with the intention of bringing out a 
clearer understanding of how international groups and the U.S. might respond in the future to 
assure peace and action under similar circumstances.   
Context and Overview 
Prior to 1992, Bosnia had not experienced national independence since losing it in 1527 
BCE to the Ottoman Empire. For the next 465 years, Bosnia was subject to the rise and fall of 
empires pulling its strings.  Due to the Slavic origin of its population, Bosnia was clumped in 
with the other ethnic-Slavs in the Balkans in what would eventually be named the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia at the end of World War I and again in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
following World War II.2  In both the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the communist federation of 
Yugoslavia, Bosnia existed as its own republic under first a monarch and then a strong, 
centralized government.  Yet throughout these 465 years, the people of Bosnia adapted and 
added to their culture many aspects of all those empires that ruled them.  This identity would 
reach its apex in the form of nationalistic fervor in the years leading up to declaring 
independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in December of 1991.  
However, what should have been a time for celebration became a burden instead, as external and 
internal forces combined to tear the country apart. 
                                                 
2
 Despite sharing a similar ethnic heritage, Bosnia and the other states of Yugoslavia possessed many 
differences including their religions and culture. 
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Conflict over the future form of Yugoslavia quickly escalated to violence.  Negotiations 
broke down between the republics and those who remained unaffiliated with either side of the 
conflict were eventually forced to choose between the two.  Bosnia, the greatest example of a 
multiethnic republic prior to the fighting, became the center of the worst atrocities as ethnic 
tensions were encouraged by those saying heterogeneous societies could never work.  Leaders 
promoting homogeneous societies brought war to Bosnia soil, and from this point on ending the 
war in Yugoslavia became synonymous with ending the war in Bosnia.  
 Amidst the fighting that took place within Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, both soldiers 
and civilians were killed.  Many died in battle, but the large majority of casualties were victims 
of a genocide perpetrated by bigoted leaders in pursuit of their own homogeneous societies.  
They facilitated this by using historical accounts of past wrongs committed against their specific 
ethnic group provoking those that were more radical to commit some of the worst crimes against 
humanity in Europe since World War II.  These included genocide, systematic rape, and 
detention camps.  The most egregious example of genocide occurred in Srebrenica, a United 
Nations declared “safe zone” where conservative estimates stated more than 8,000 Muslim men 
and boys were massacred in a matter of days.  It was in the wake of these tragedies that 
spectators began to recall the horrific acts of the Holocaust as human beings were again rounded 
up and executed in mass on European soil.  That genocide could again take place in Europe was 
difficult to comprehend, yet what was even more incomprehensible was that the United Nations 
was present from the beginning with the goal of finding a peaceful solution.  
The collapse of Yugoslavia, and the horrific acts committed by the different sides, set the 
stage for a redefining of international law and order.  The Soviet Union had only recently 
collapsed, and the United States, NATO, and the United Nations were determining what their 
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roles would be without the existence of a second superpower in the world.  Each of their actions 
in Bosnia would be a testament to how future crises might play out.  In this conflict, the U.S. and 
the countries represented by the UN and NATO pursued a cooperative effort to achieve peace, 
with the Europeans taking the lead.  Unfortunately this led to a drawn out engagement and the 
questioning of UN policy-making in crisis situations.   
The questioning of the UN derived in part from dissatisfaction regarding the depth and 
duration in which abuses were allowed to continue.  Prior to war breaking out or independence 
from Yugoslavia being claimed by any of the republics, Helsinki Watch (now known as Human 
Rights Watch3) recommended in its 1990 World Report “that economic sanctions be used against 
the federal government of Yugoslavia and, when possible, against the government of the republic 
of Serbia” due to its involvement “in egregious human rights abuses in the province of Kosovo4.”  
The report also highlighted the situation in Croatia and the other republics as potential sites of 
future “explosive human rights situations.”5  This report could not have been more accurate.   
Dissatisfaction also derived from the clarity and accessibility of events taking place in 
Bosnia to those outside the country and region of Bosnia, specifically the political leaders of the 
international community, as “no other atrocity campaign in the twentieth century was better 
monitored and understood by the U.S. government” and its allies in the UN and NATO.6  The 
citizens of the US and UN nations could watch events unfold and even listen to them in near real 
                                                 
3
 As an internationally respected and cited nongovernmental organization (NGO) created in 1978, the 
Human Rights Watch investigates potential human rights abuses firsthand in order to bring those responsible for 
abuses to justice.   
4
 Kosovo was uniquely Yugoslavian existing as its own autonomous province during Tito’s rule with about 
ninety percent of the region being ethnically Albanian and Muslim and the other ten percent being ethnically Serb 
and Orthodox Christian.  It is landlocked sharing borders with Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.  War 
would break out here following the war in Bosnia. 
5
 Human Rights Watch, HRW.org - http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1990/WR90/HELSINKI.BOU-
05.htm#P714_157941 (Accessed April 25, 2011). 
6
 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, (New York: Basic Books, 
2002), 264. 
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time during the war.  In doing so, both leaders and the public at large were forced to ask 
themselves “how much human suffering are we prepared to watch before we intervene?”7  The 
record of the Bosnian War revealed that sum of human suffering to be high. 
Historiography 
 
The breadth of literature about the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War is still in 
its infancy as new details continue to emerge about this period.  The New York Times offered 
great coverage of the conflict as it panned out in Yugoslavia.  As a prestigious newspaper, it 
represented the information the American public had access to in its reporting of local, national, 
and international news.  It also presented a good timeline of events.  Coupled with books and 
journal articles from a wide spectrum of journals which have focused on the explanation of the 
conflict and its roots, the larger conflict in Yugoslavia and the specific violence in Bosnia can be 
brought to a greater understanding.  What is certain is that the international community should 
have intervened in a more radical fashion earlier in the conflict in order to avoid the 
humanitarian crisis and war that followed.  Instead they spent months, then years, debating what 
the right course of action would be while the situation became direr.  
There are two historiographical debates which exist regarding the Bosnian War.  The first 
debate is over who deserves blame in and for the war itself of the three sides involved: Bosnian, 
Croatian, and Serbian.8  In this debate, one argument holds that the Serbs deserve all blame for 
what happened and anything done by the Croatian or Bosnian sides was in response to an action 
by the Serbs.  The other side of the argument is that each ethnic group shares some blame since 
                                                 
7
 Walzer, xii. 
8
 Both Franjo Tudjman, the leader of Croatia, and Slobodan Milosevic, the leader of Serbia and 
Montenegro, pursued the possibility of taking parts of Bosnia for themselves in their pursuit of ethnically 
homogeneous nations.  Thus, even though the worst of the fighting began in Croatia, an eventual stalemate between 
Serbian and Croatian forces there led to the fighting spilling over and intensifying in Bosnia where Bosnian Muslims 
were added into the mix. 
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each group at some point committed actions outside the rules of war and humanity against the 
“others,” and none of them were initially willing to yield at the negotiating table.  This is the 
debate that is most fiercely contested between the ethnic groups of Bosnia today as they look 
back on the events of the Bosnian War and try to make sense of what happened and why.  
 The second debate is the positive or negative role that the international community in the 
form of the United Nations played in brokering a peace agreement and bringing the war in 
Bosnia to its end.  Since the war ended, there have been numerous books and articles that have 
critiqued how events transpired and what could have been done differently, and overwhelmingly 
the role of the international community is viewed in a negative light.  Thus, the debate is less 
over whether the UN had a positive or negative role, and instead is focused on the degree to 
which the international community contributed to the creation of a prolonged and muddled peace 
brokering and whether more action should or could have been taken.  The debate also takes into 
account the role of the U.S.—both in its position as the sole superpower and in whether it could 
have done more to negotiate a change in UN policy.  It is the argument of this paper that the 
United Nations handled intervention poorly until it was pushed by the Clinton administration to 
respond to Serbian aggression with force.  Therefore, Clinton and his advisors deserve some 
praise for finally pursuing a harsher response when terms were broken; however, both the U.S. 
and the UN remain guilty of failing to act with such force earlier. This failure to act is what 
allowed hostilities to increase among all three ethnic groups and nations, and it only became 
worse as the aggressors became ever more emboldened by UN inaction. 
 Since this paper primarily focuses on the international community in the form of the U.S., 
the EC, the UN and NATO, the second historiographical debate is of principal concern.  
However, it is important to state that this paper holds that the Serbs, and specifically the Bosnian 
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Serbs and military under the control of President Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Radovan 
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic in Bosnia, were the primary perpetrators of the war in Bosnia, 
though not the exclusive participants in crimes committed against humanity.  
 In identifying specific problems in international intervention, one must first realize that 
determining international policy is no easy thing when delving into a new situation that is 
different from any other that has ever taken place before.  There were many individual countries 
and international groups that had a hand in determining policy for brokering a peace settlement.  
This made it difficult to come to decisive actions quickly.  Further complicating matters, the 
collapse of Yugoslavia presented a new and frightening challenge for the UN, especially as war 
broke out first in Slovenia and Croatia and only then spread to Bosnia.  The purposes set forth by 
the UN charter clearly demonstrated that the UN had an obligation to act in order “to maintain 
international peace and security,” and it was quick to involve itself in the peace process because 
of this.  However, what took place following this initial response is where the debate over just 
how poorly the situation in Bosnia was handled begins.   
The War in Bosnia lasted almost four years with hundreds of thousands of lives lost, the 
country’s infrastructure almost entirely destroyed, and many of the worst atrocities taking place 
late in the peace process.  Thus, it is easy for one to understand why the international community 
has taken criticism for its role there.  Out of this criticism come different views over just how 
strongly fault should rest on the UN and whether others, like the U.S., deserve to be grouped in 
with the UN as well. 
The firmest proponent for placing most of the fault on the UN and all of the “West” is 
David Rieff , a New York journalist, author and policy analyst.  He states that, “Bosnia was and 
always will be a just cause.  It should have been the West’s cause.  To have intervened on the 
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side of Bosnia would have been self-defense, not charity.”9  He takes this even further when he 
says that: 
What has taken place in Bosnia has revealed the bankruptcy of every European security 
institution, from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Council on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, exposed the fact that nowhere in these great structures was there 
either intellectual preparedness or moral fortitude for dealing with the crises of the post-
Cold War world or for coming to terms with the likelihood that in the future a great many 
wars will take place not between states but within states.10 
 
Thus, according to Rieff, the international community’s leadership failed to understand the 
changing world which allowed for it to be completely unprepared for engagements like Bosnia. 
Warren Zimmerman, the United States’ last ambassador to Yugoslavia before its demise, 
took a slightly less firm stance on the failure of the international community than Rieff in his 
book Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers.  In the book he places blame on 
the UN, NATO and the U.S. for how peace was pursued, but he also points to the leaders of the 
republics and ethnic parties as the main protagonists in destroying their own nations. 
Another side of the debate considers the specific role of the United States.  Samantha 
Power, a journalist at the time of the Bosnian War, examined the response of the US to the acts 
of genocide which took place in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the world.  In her research, 
she became critical of the US leadership saying that  
the personalities and geopolitical constraints influencing U.S. decision-making have 
shifted with time, but the United States has consistently refused to take risks in order to 
suppress genocide.  The United States is not alone.  The states bordering genocidal 
societies and the European powers have looked away as well.  Despite broad public 
consensus that genocide should “never again” be allowed, and a good deal of 
triumphalism about the ascent of liberal democratic values, the last decade of the 
twentieth century was one of the most deadly in the grimmest century on record.”11 
 
                                                 
9
 David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 
10. 
10
 Ibid, 22. 
11
 Power, 503. 
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Essentially, little had changed since World War II in terms of effective international intervention 
in conflicts, and the U.S. especially needed to be held accountable for having the power to act 
but not doing so until it was too late. 
 Similar to Power’s position, Wayne Bert, a former policy analyst for the Defense 
Department, took a critical look at U.S. involvement and determined that the U.S. had a duty to 
take the lead yet forfeited that duty in the interests of its relationship with the other members of 
the UN and NATO.  This then led to a prolonged engagement.  In his book, The Reluctant 
Superpower, he criticized the international community in the form of the UN and its European 
members for their failure to resolve the war while leading the peace process.  Bert also detailed 
some of the good ideas that the U.S. leadership had and failed to promote strongly enough in 
order to show that the U.S. was complicit in the initial failure of the peace process.   
 The final individual who demonstrated a unique perspective on the role of the U.S. in the 
Bosnian War was Richard Holbrooke.  Holbrooke served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for 
Europe between 1994 and 1996 and brokered the Dayton Peace Accords in Ohio.  In his book, 
To End A War, he considered the role of the U.S. in a more positive light by looking at what was 
achieved to bring the war to an end.  According to his experience, Europe and the UN achieved 
little in their negotiating which only made the Serb aggressors act more boldly in defying the 
UN’s peacekeeping mission.  The U.S. leadership then took a risk by taking over the negotiation 
process.  That risk paid off, and Holbrooke praised the U.S. leadership for its willingness to act 
in achieving a final peace settlement at Dayton.  However, he also pointed out that this action 
came too late and that there was a certain amount of luck involved in the outcome.   
 The most comprehensive book on U.S. foreign policy throughout the 1990s came from 
Pulitzer Prize-winning author, journalist and historian David Halberstam in his book War in a 
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Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals.  No other writer better understood the inner 
workings of Presidents Bush and Clinton and their staff.  Much of his work stemmed from 
personal interviews with the individuals themselves, and the book gave a very detailed account 
of the complexity of the situation that the collapse of Yugoslavia and ensuing war represented.  
The details did not distract from an incredible understanding of the big picture either.  Bosnia 
was a major focus of foreign policy for the U.S., but it was not the only one.  Halberstam 
approached the roles of the two U.S. administrations and their European counterparts in the UN 
and NATO in terms of where they placed foreign policy as a priority.  He then broke down how 
that was changed by the individuals that were making the decisions throughout the 1990s and 
how events affected them.  According to Halberstam, there were no larger than life individuals 
that single-handedly ended the war.  There were merely the right and wrong people for getting 
the job done, and the presidents, their civilian staff, and their military staff only found those 
people through trial and error. 
 Other individuals writing about the conflict did so without focusing on the negative or 
positive aspects of international intervention.  Instead, they merely detailed many of the major 
events of Yugoslavia’s collapse and the Bosnian War.  The first of these was Noel Malcolm, an 
English historian, writer and columnist who has devoted himself to Bosnia and currently chairs 
the Board of Trustees for the Bosnian Institute.12  As a foreign advocate of Bosnia and its people, 
Malcolm addressed the history well in giving his readers perspective on Bosnia’s history with the 
emphasis being on education about the country and its origins.  His insight gave the war 
historical context rather than just describing the war as a lone event in time. 
                                                 
12
 The Bosnian Institute is a key organization internationally in providing education and information on the 
history and culture of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a special concern for the past and present development of its social, 
economic, governmental, legal and cultural conditions, organizations and institutions. Through its programmes it 
actively encourages and supports the growth of a pluralist democratic society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its 
neighbours. - Citation from Bosnian Institute Website’s ‘About Us’ Page, http://www.bosnia.org.uk/ 
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 The final figure that bears mentioning in the historiography of the Bosnian War is Misha 
Glenny.  Glenny is a British journalist who traveled between the republics as Yugoslavia fell 
apart and actually met many of the major figures in person during his travels and he has made his 
career writing about the Balkans.  In both The Balkans and The Fall of Yugoslavia, Glenny 
breaks down all the republics of former Yugoslavia and the nations that surrounded them in 
order to better understand the histories of each place.  In The Fall of Yugoslavia he does this best 
in looking at the different leaders involved in the conflict and defending Bosnia due to its 
location between the two larger perpetrators, Croatia and Serbia, but not absolving it of some of 
the guilt.  Glenny’s personal experience helped him contribute greatly to the history of Bosnia 
and the Balkans at large.   
 Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia all had a hand in the destruction of Bosnia, but the Serbian 
and Bosnian Serb leadership, and to a lesser extent the Croatian leadership, committed the 
majority of offenses in perpetrating crimes on the Bosnian civilian population and repeatedly 
defied the international community and the peace negotiations.  It also holds that the United 
Nations committed a great number of blunders—the worst of which was allowing for the 
Bosnian War to go on for so long without acting strongly to counter Serbian aggression.  This 
then allowed for the turmoil in Croatia to spread into Bosnia.  Finally, the United States, while 
considering solutions that later proved to be successful in bringing hostilities to an end, was 
complicit because it failed to firmly promote any new actions with its European allies that were 
leading the negotiations.  U.S. reluctance to back up its words with physical actions condemned 
it.  However, in doing so it preserved a good standing internationally in a time in which great 
change was taking place and any brash actions might have unsettled the work that was taking 
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place with Russia and other countries that appeared on the surface to be moving away from 
communism. 
A Brief History of Twentieth Century Yugoslavia 
 Any study of Bosnia in the U.S. must begin with a short history of Yugoslavia in order to 
facilitate a greater understanding of how the various wars in the 1990s were not unprecedented to 
observers of Yugoslavia in the twentieth century.  Yugoslavia as it was known up until the 
beginning of the 1990s was a relatively recent creation in terms of its history as a nation, even at 
the end of the twentieth century.  “Yugoslavia was created in 1918 out of the shambles of World 
War I, and by the collapse of two empires: the Hapsburgs in the northwest and the Ottomans in 
the southeast.  On the territory of modern Yugoslavia, only Serbia and Montenegro were 
independent of the two empires before 1918.”13  It was first known as the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes following World War I, and was literally a creation by the victors at the 
end of the War.14   
Though they shared a common Slavic ancestry, the groups making up the new kingdom 
actually possessed many differences along ethnic, religious, cultural, and historical lines.  
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
prior to and during WWI.  For example, Serbia had been its own independent nation as had 
Montenegro.  And Macedonia had been a part of the Ottoman Empire.  These were diverse 
groups which suddenly were part of a single nation.  It is no surprise then that they would later 
face difficulties in trying to coexist peacefully.  Different people groups accustomed to their own 
belief systems and histories must share a strong bond after a major conflict in order for any unity 
to be upheld.  Despite this, Yugoslavia managed to remain relatively united prior to World War 
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II.  But this tenuous experiment in forced unity broke down quickly following the rapid defeat of 
its military and collapse of its government following the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s entry into the 
war. 
 During World War II, three major sides emerged of Yugoslav origins.  The first were 
those of a Croatian puppet dictatorship set up by the Nazis under the care of Ante Pavelic and his 
Ustashe fighters.  These were Croatian nationalists who clung to terror tactics in order to 
subjugate those who would not bow their knee to them.  They represented a minority of the 
population, but the terror they imposed on the population of non-Croatian ethnic groups set a 
precedent for hatred and vengeance which would reemerge fifty years later as Yugoslavia again 
splintered.  The second group was ethnically based and considered a loyalist group because they 
sought to reinstate the exiled monarchy after the war ended.  They were known as Chetniks and 
were made up of Serbian patriots led by Draza Mihailovic. The third group, which eventually 
won the contest for supremacy, was that of the Communist Partisans, or the KPJ.  They were led 
by Josip Broz Tito and fought simply for future control over Yugoslavia which they eventually 
won.  These groups all committed atrocities on their fellow countrymen in seeking to come out 
victorious at the end of the war leading to a cycle of violence being created that would be 
revisited at the end of the century.   
The civil war which devoured the Kingdom of Yugoslavia following the flight of its 
leaders left many victims, but few victors, as each of the three groups involved pursued its own 
violent agenda against any and all opposition.  This created a situation in which the strongest 
would come out on top.  Each side bore responsibility for not breaking this cycle, but the greater 
tragedy was that the violence was never dealt with, or resolved, after the war.  Instead it was 
merely replaced for a while by the strong hand of Tito who kept antagonism between the 
16 
 
different ethnic groups temporarily at bay only for it to return with a vengeance later on between 
new generations of Yugoslavs that had experienced only peace.   
To reiterate, “the conquerors (Axis) had both destroyed Yugoslavia as a state and set its 
components against each other…” using repressive tactics which “created an environment 
favorable to the propagation of revolutionary war.”15  In the vacuum of leadership, the Ustasha 
began a campaign of massacres against the Serbs and other non-Croat groups.  The Serbs under 
Mihailovic and the multi-ethnic Partisans under Tito then rose in self-defense against the Ustasha 
and committed retaliatory massacres of their own against the Ustasha, each other, and the Axis 
troops stationed in the country.  This was the legacy of World War II in Yugoslavia, and despite 
Tito’s ability to keep the peace during his reign as dictator he failed miserably in creating an 
environment in which the formerly competing groups could completely move on from the 
grievances of the past.   
 Once the civil war was over, Tito brought all the republics of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
under his rule.  Yugoslavia then became a communist federation with its power solely invested in 
him.  His rule was very much like Stalin’s in this way, and the initial position of Tito following 
World War II placed him firmly on the side of the Soviet Union, but Stalin offended him in 1948 
by seeking to influence Tito’s Yugoslavia by trying to include it in the Cominform.  The 
Cominform took the place of the former Comintern with its focus on ideological solidarity 
among the Soviet Union and other communist nations with the Soviets taking a leading role.  
Tito, however, was unwilling to “sacrifice sovereignty for the sake of ideological solidarity.”16  
After all, “he (Tito) and his partisans, not the Red Army, had driven the Nazis out; unlike any of 
the other East European counterparts, Tito did not depend upon Stalin’s support to remain in 
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power.”  Instead, “efforts to subject him to Cominform orthodoxy caused Tito to bristle, and by 
the end of June, 1948, he had openly broken with Moscow.”17  Soon after breaking with Stalin, 
relations were opened up between Tito and the West, especially the United States.   
 A Yugoslavia which remained communist but set itself apart from Stalin was of great 
value to the United States.  It revealed that the “iron curtain” had potential weaknesses which 
could be exploited.  Thus, the U.S. pursued an agenda which would bring Yugoslavia into its 
influence, predominantly through economic resistance.  Tito never aligned himself with the U.S., 
but the U.S. continued to pursue more influence with Yugoslavia while contenting itself with 
Tito acting as a barrier to Soviet hegemony. However, the end of the Cold War changed all that, 
and the U.S. quickly lost interest in Yugoslavia with the fall of its once mighty adversary.   
 Within Yugoslavia, the peace that Tito was able to sustain after the unrest brought on by 
World War II was nothing short of amazing.  The most striking peace was that which he 
achieved between Croatians and Serbs.  “Some Croats, at least, could take satisfaction in the fact 
that Marshal Tito was a Croat by birth and upbringing.  Some Serbs could find satisfaction in the 
fact that fellow Serbs held a disproportionately large number of positions in the army, secret 
police, and federal bureaucracy.”18  The success he achieved was not universal, however.  Many 
of the policies Tito used had negative impacts later on after his death.  The greatest failure was 
that he did not allow others a voice in his regime.  This made the rise of nationalism at the end of 
the century all the more reactive.  The fact that two of the presidents of the emerging republics 
had been political prisoners under Tito speaks to this fact.19 
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The Decline of Yugoslavia 
 What occurred in Yugoslavia during World War II was a historical representation of what 
could happen again if events were allowed to continue along the course they took at the end of 
the century.  The international community should have learned from the WWII example and 
listened to organizations like Helsinki Watch, but this was regrettably not to be.  War did not 
spontaneously break out again in Yugoslavia, however.  There were early indicators of what was 
to come with a gradual buildup of tension before an actual outburst of violence.  This buildup 
gave the international community time to react, but time and again they either failed to act or 
capitulated to the stronger party’s demands allowing actions to take place that further strained 
relations between the different groups at the table.  All the while the outlook for those at risk in 
Yugoslavia’s affected republics worsened.   
 With Tito’s death in 1980 Yugoslavia lost the one person capable of holding the nation 
together politically.  The tenuous ground on which the Communist federation had been built 
began to crumble, and then collapsed, with the end of the Cold War, and just ten years later a war 
broke out which in many ways resembled that which was brought to an end with Tito’s victory 
following World War II.   A country which seemed so promising just a few years earlier had 
slipped into civil war, but in many ways the civil war was inevitable as a result of the many 
deep-lying issues at its core.  All that was needed to set off the war was a collapse in the federal 
government, the glue upon which solidarity within Yugoslavia was built, and that is just what 
happened. According to Zimmerman, Tito “unwittingly stimulated nationalism by destroying the 
central government’s viability, empowering the republics, and creating the ludicrously feeble 
collective presidency.”20  Yugoslavia only existed, because Tito held it together by putting the 
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needs of Yugoslavia as a whole ahead of the desires of its individual parts.  When Tito died, that 
all changed.  A strong federal leader was replaced by leaders that either lacked the strength and 
Yugoslav nationalism of Tito, or were for their republics or provinces first and the nation of 
Yugoslavia second.  Without a strong leader to subdue the republics, the nation of Yugoslavia 
began to unravel. 
Republican issues became outcries of nationalism throughout the 1980s.  Nationalism 
alone was not a bad thing.  It was only when nationalism became interconnected with a desire for 
ethnic homogeneity by those in power that nationalism went from being a source of pride to a 
weapon for those who held on to grievances tracing back to World War II and beyond.  With 
language and hostilities escalating, the leaders and their zealot followers loosed their hatred on 
their neighbors and encouraged others in their same ethnic group to follow suit. 
  At the beginning of 1990, there was speculation and fear that Yugoslavia was already on 
the verge of collapse, but the nature of that collapse was not yet known.  In 1989, Romania 
experienced a successful, bloody revolution against the head of its Communist government who 
was promptly executed along with his wife.  This led leaders to fear what might be in their own 
future as “Yugoslav Communists and their opponents” began to “agree that in this nation with a 
long history of civil strife, a fear of a violent anti-communist backlash” had potential to become 
a reality.21  But the bigger question was “whether the old, passionate rivalry among Yugoslavia’s 
ethnic groups [might] tear apart the Communist Party or even the nation.”22  This was exactly 
what happened in 1990.  Tom Gallagher, an historian and writer of The Balkans after the Cold 
War, determined that holding “a genuinely competitive all-Yugoslav election” would have 
allowed for “forces committed to a democratic Yugoslavia based on ethnic parity” to compete 
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for power.  Yet, when elections took place in each of the six republics, the end result of those 
elections gave “initiative to parties who wanted either to take their republic out of Yugoslavia, or 
recentralize it around their own ethnic group.”23  This led to even greater divisions as ethnicity 
became a point of contention. 
Eventually Yugoslavia as it had existed under Tito ceased to exist.  Placing the blame on 
one specific republic or individual is impossible to do when looking at the collapse of 
Yugoslavia, however, and nothing is gained by pointing fingers.  But the breakup did happen as 
had been speculated.  One of the first steps toward collapse started with the Communist party’s 
splintering.  This began with the Slovenian walkout of the party conference on Jan 23, 1990.  
After this, the “delegates left to return to their republics, where local Communist parties began 
emergency meetings to see whether they should pull out of the national organization or pull back 
together.”24  These meetings led to the eventual split over how the different republics viewed the 
future of Yugoslavia.   
  The Slovenian walkout was based on their frustrations over “deeply unequal levels of 
development.”25  The leaders of Slovenia felt that their republic was holding up the poorer 
republics of Yugoslavia, and they were not wrong in this belief.  Their solution was to give more 
sovereignty to the individual republics thereby decreasing the power of the federal government 
but retaining unity.  The Serbian leadership took the polar opposite position to this with the 
president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, calling for the strengthening of the federal government 
in order to keep Yugoslavia strong.  Montenegro followed the Serbian lead in advocating this 
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plan.  With these two sides in opposition to one another and unwilling to compromise, the other 
republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were forced to pick a side in the widening rift.   
The question as to who should take the blame for starting the war is a complicated one to 
answer.  As Yugoslavia began falling apart, each side pointed to the other in claiming that it was 
them who had started it and not us.  Our actions were merely a response to those of the other.  
Serbia said that it was Croatia and Slovenia acting selfishly in their move to secede which set the 
collapse in motion.  They also pointed at the international community for meddling in 
Yugoslavia’s affairs in recognizing the secessionist republics.  Croatia and Slovenia in turn 
blamed the Serbs for being uncompromising in their desire to invest more power in the federal 
government at the cost of any independent movement.  What is lost in the finger-pointing is that 
they all had a hand in bringing Yugoslavia to ruin.  The situation only spun out of control after 
each side refused to step down and began to doggedly pursue their own agendas in response to 
the actions of their opponents rather than seeking a peaceful alternative.  Fear led to greater fear 
and violence led only to additional, increasingly extreme violence while emotions prevailed over 
reason.  
The leaders of the republics only made matters worse through their actions and words.  
Slobodan Milosevic was one of the most important names to remember in understanding what 
became of Yugoslavia.  Milosevic took control over the presidency of Serbia in 1988.  Following 
this, he led the charge for giving more power to the federal government at the cost of weakening 
the republics, essentially counteracting what Tito had set into motion prior to his death.   
Individuals that worked with Milosevic experienced different personalities.  Warren 
Zimmerman, saw two sides of Milosevic.  One “was hard-line, authoritarian, belligerent, bent on 
chaos, and wedded to the use of force to create a Greater Serbia.”  A second “was polite, affable, 
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cooperative, and always looking for reasonable solutions to Yugoslavia’s problems.”26  These 
two sides of Milosevic were just covers for what David Halberstam saw as the true Milosevic—
the supernationalist.  When Slovenia and Croatia seceded, the supernationalist Milosevic 
emerged, and his focus changed to creating a Greater Serbia which would include all Serbs of 
former Yugoslavia.27  
The problem with this was that absorbing all the Serbian population was not a realistic 
goal.  Most communities in Yugoslavia had become ethnically mixed over time, thus any attempt 
to create a homogenous Serbian state would force those of other ethnicities into the severe 
minority or cause mass migration over fear of living under a hostile Serbian government.  
Serbian authorities had done nothing to assuage such fears by their actions up to this point.  
Kosovo had fallen under a sort of “apartheid” during the 1980s with thousands of Albanians 
losing their jobs only to have Serbs “dispatched to fill key positions.”28  This was the example of 
minority rights that the other nations had in front of them, and clearly this was not a good option.  
A member of the executive council of the ruling Muslim party in Bosnia stated it well when he 
said, “the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina will never accept the freedoms given to the 
Albanians of Kosovo.”29   
 The position of the Serbian leadership also came to a take an increasingly hard-line as the 
situation escalated.  Milosevic and the other Serb leaders calling for complete Serbian autonomy 
made it clear that “the destiny of all Serbs was to live in one state, and since all land on which 
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Serbs lived was by definition Serb land, it rightfully belonged to ‘Greater Serbia.’”30  In January 
of 1991, this action was officially threatened by Milosevic when he said he would “demand 
territory from neighboring republics” if a confederation was created.31  What this demand failed 
to represent was the other ethnicities represented in the areas he was demanding.  This was a 
statement which the international community should have jumped on in condemning Milosevic 
and threatening action.  Instead, his threat was later allowed to be carried out upon the populace 
of the republics of Croatia and, most disastrously, Bosnia.  This ideology was also allowed to 
permeate the communities of Serbs in the other republics who could now look to Serbia as their 
protector if they felt in any way threatened. 
No one made this position more frighteningly clear than Radovan Karadzic, the leader of 
the Bosnian Serbs, when speaking about Sarajevo.  He proclaimed that, “Sarajevo was Serb 
because Serbs had been there first, implying that Bosniacs (Muslim Bosnians) were some kind of 
alien force that had moved into Sarajevo from somewhere else; anything not purely Serb 
Orthodox was a form of occupation and had to be eliminated.”32  This was clearly a radical 
position held only by the more extreme Serbs, yet throughout the eventual war, this was the 
position which was voiced loudest.  The international community should have picked up on this 
red flag.  Despite the ubiquity of demonizing opponents through propaganda in war today, talk of 
the elimination of other ethnic groups should always trigger a strong response from international 
peacekeeping organizations like the UN.  The statements made by those making policy were not 
hard to understand in what they implicated.  In the statement above by Karadzic, there could be 
no mistaking his intent for Sarajevo.  Yet the voices of these individuals were ignored by the 
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leaders in the U.S. and Europe despite the frightening language being used.  The threats of these 
leaders should have been taken seriously as their twisted nationalism would be a leading factor in 
the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
 Milosevic was not the sole Yugoslavian leader bent on a land grab if Yugoslavia 
collapsed.  Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia also wanted to carve out his own piece of 
Yugoslavia if it fell apart.  Much like Milosevic, he desired a Greater Croatia which would 
encompass all Croatians into one nation; however, Tudjman lacked the military means to deliver 
on this intent.33  Throughout the fall of Yugoslavia and War in Bosnia, he would prove himself 
to be just as stubborn as Milosevic, and he might have been convicted of war crimes as well had 
he not died in 1999.   
Bosnia had the misfortune of being positioned directly between these two leaders and 
their nations, and its “central location and mixed ethnic and religious profile ma[de] it a natural 
battleground between the forces on opposite sides of the confederation-federation conflict.”34  
Thus, as the peace talks floundered, any and all hope for a peaceful resolution was lost.  With no 
desire to negotiate, Milosevic and Tudjman’s selfish ambitions led the way towards the 
destruction of not only Bosnia’s territory and people, but their own country’s international 
reputations and structural integrity. 
 The propaganda of the republics, especially Serbia, was essential to the build-up of 
tensions in Yugoslavia.  Propaganda was used to instill fear in populations by pointing to past 
atrocities the other ethnic groups had committed in order to encourage their own population to 
act out first for protection of their own interests.  Serbia mastered this tactic early on.  One of 
Milosevic’s first targets was Politika, a large circulation Serbian newspaper.  The other republics 
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followed soon after leading to a cycle of fear promoting violence as a twisted form of protection.  
Thus, those in power took the lessons of history and coupled them with information technology 
in order to create a frenzy out of which war would come.35   
The media is a strong catalyst in its ability to prompt action by those who fall under its 
auspices.  This was especially true when looking at the role of state-sponsored propaganda in 
inciting action.  The Serbian government proved highly effective in its use of history as a 
propaganda tool for demonizing the other ethnic groups.  For Croatians, all they had to do was 
point back to World War II and the role of the Ustasha.  Journalist Chuck Sudetic pointed out 
some of the historical wrongs that were being used.   
Serbs have a tradition of armed resistance and a memory of atrocities committed by 
Croatia’s wartime Fascist regime.  That memory has spawned a deep fear of Croatian 
nationalism.  Crude, sensationalist disinformation spread by Serbian demagogues and 
Belgrade’s government-backed media has whipped up the Serbs’ fears to a dangerous 
frenzy.36 
 
In order to demonize the Muslims of former Yugoslavia, the Serbian leadership had to look 
much further back in history.  Then, “by conflating the demons of yesteryear with the stereotypes 
of today, neighbors were converted into the conquering Turks of the Middle Ages who had 
occupied ‘Serb’ lands and oppressed the Serb nation.”37  This allowed for Milosevic, Karadzic 
and other Serbian leaders like them to demonize the Muslim populations outside of their borders 
in areas like Bosnia and Kosovo.  Because the ethnic Serbs in these areas represented minorities 
of the population, the potential threat to them by the Muslims was far more evident. 
The great crimes Milosevic and his underlings were able to perpetuate on their victims 
bore testimony to their achievements in slander and fear mongering.  According to Stephen 
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Engelberg of The New York Times, Milosevic’s pursuit of a Greater Serbia employed a single 
strategy.  “Each step begins with a propaganda campaign stressing injustices—usually grossly 
exaggerated—done to Serbs…Having stoked the fires with propaganda, Milosevic then pressures 
his target, either through organized demonstrations, military action or diplomacy.”38  As tension 
escalated to war, “military action” became the means by which Milosevic could achieve his goal 
of Serbian autonomy through the destruction of the non-Serb populations.  Without minority or 
majority groups present to advocate for the land he desired for the Serbs, then he would have a 
much easier time keeping it for himself and the nation of Serbia.  Thus, “the lists of crimes that 
Serb religious nationalists had claimed falsely were being carried out against Serbs became a 
blueprint for Serb nationalist programs of ethnic cleansing.”39   
The Serbian leadership and individuals on the ground following the genocidal policies 
were not alone in their transgressions, however.  The other republics counterattacked, often with 
the same policies in place.  Nasir Oric, a Bosnian Muslim, took charge of the irregular Muslim 
forces in and around Srebrenica and attacked Serb-controlled villages massacring many in those 
villages.40  Reprisals like these and the acts that inspired them promoted the idea that 
heterogeneity in ethnic demographics might not be possible despite a more recent history of 
peaceful coexistence in Bosnia and the whole of Yugoslavia prior to the war.  So instead of 
focusing on recent history as the best solution, leaders succeeded in pursuing their purpose of 
homogeneous states through the use of mass genocide and expulsions.  John F. Burns of The 
New York Times summarized this well. 
Like the killings of civilians, the expulsions reflect in microcosm what has happened 
across wide areas of Croatia in the last year, and more recently in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina… In these places, groups of heavily armed men—most often Serbs, but also 
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Croats in areas of Croatia where there are ethnic Serbian minorities, and Croats and 
Muslim Slavs in some Serbian minority areas of Bosnia—seek to unscramble the ethnic 
map.  It is demographic engineering on a huge scale, generating new hatreds that seem 
likely to plague this part of the Balkans for generations.41 
 
Hatred overshadowed the peace which had transpired in the decades since World War II.  That 
hatred was again stoked by this war, but this new generation had the opportunity to learn from 
the mistakes made by their elders.  In a quote taken from the New Yorker, Lawrence Lifschultz, 
a former South Asia correspondent, and his wife Rabia Ali, a Pakistani-born writer and research 
analyst at the World Bank's Research Department, suggested that what South Africa and the 
former Yugoslavia had in common was “simply their pain and their manipulation by politicians 
who exploit[ed] the idea that only ethnically homogeneous societies [could] be successful.”42  
This belief was at the core of Milosevic and Tudjman’s leadership and strategies, the very 
foundations of which the European Community and especially the United States should have 
been quick to understand and reveal to be false.  Unfortunately, the U.S. and their European 
allies failed to react to these early signs of disintegration, and the reactive nationalism of the 
Yugoslavian republics soon led it to collapse.  
The Collapse of Yugoslavia 
 In a last ditch effort, the republics of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s leaders 
offered one final compromise in an effort to stave off disaster.  Reported on June 7, 1991 in The 
New York Times, their proposal recommended that the republics of Yugoslavia would gain their 
sovereignty as nations, but they would seek no international recognition or membership in the 
United Nations.43  This was an attempt at appeasing the two opposing sides by giving autonomy 
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to the different republics while keeping Yugoslavia intact as the one recognized entity of the 
international community.  The leaders of Macedonia and Bosnia refused to give up on 
compromise because they knew each of their republics would be at a significant disadvantage 
should negotiations lead to war.  Bosnians were especially worried about what would happen 
with both Croatia and Serbia claiming land within Bosnia’s borders.  The situation finally 
reached its breaking point on June 25, 1991 with the secession of Croatia and then Slovenia.  
According to Glenny, the secessions were the events which finally “woke the demons of civil 
war from their 46-year-old hibernation,” and a war which had been silenced with Tito’s 
consolidation of power was once again ignited between the republics.44 
 Without a strong backing by the international community to deter an eventual military 
confrontation, and with every attempt at compromise through negotiations having failed, 
Yugoslavia finally succumbed to the opposing leaders’ resolve to settle the dispute through 
strength of arms.  The first place to experience this confrontation was Slovenia.  Fighting began 
“after Serbia, the largest of the nation’s republics and the dominant force in the Yugoslav 
military, made clear that it would use force to hold the federation together and prevent Slovenia 
from setting up border checkpoints and taking other steps toward autonomy.45  Fortunately for 
the Slovenians, this attempt was quickly fended off and they retained their independence.  The 
other secessionist republics of Croatia and Bosnia were not so fortunate, however, as Milosevic 
and the Yugoslav army now set their gaze on them.  Questions quickly arose regarding whether 
the Yugoslav army was really still under the control of the Yugoslav leadership after this attempt 
at keeping Slovenia in through force was taken without the authority of the Yugoslav Prime 
Minister, Ante Markovic.  The military, especially its officers, had continued to remain 
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predominantly Serb since World War II.  This trend continued into the 1990s for Yugoslavia, so 
it came as little surprise that the military was vulnerable to honoring the Serbian leadership and 
authority when Yugoslavia collapsed.  There were many desertions following their actions as 
soldiers from the other republics defected to defend their new nations, families, and homes, but a 
majority of the military remained in service under Milosevic and the Serbian military complex.   
 Croatia was the next nation to be attacked by what remained of the Yugoslav army.  At 
this point, casualties began to grow and the international community under the auspices of the 
United Nations finally began to notice and resond.  After only six months of fighting, devastation 
was already apparent: thousands of soldiers and civilians were dead, Eastern Europe’s most 
promising economy was fragmented and destroyed, half a million refugees had been created and 
hatred had been incited for future generations of conflict.  Yet despite all of this wreckage, “it 
had not yet produced a decisive military result.”46  Without such a result, war spread into Bosnia 
where there was a large population of ethnic Serbs. 
 While negotiations were taking place, and even after war was raging in Croatia, the 
Bosnian President, Izetbegovic, continuously tried to ensure that peace would reign in Bosnia.  
Ultimately, he had four real options he could pursue.  His first option would be to follow Croatia 
and Slovenia’s compromise plan which would promote more sovereignty for the republics, but 
this would place him in direct opposition to Serbia.  Secondly, Izetbegovic could side with the 
Serbians in promoting a stronger federal government for Yugoslavia, but after the secession of 
the other republics, this was not a desirable position.  For the Muslims especially, this 
represented “the scenario they fear[ed] most: the creation of a greater Serbia,” and they were 
right to fear this due to what “a whittled-down Yugoslavia” would logistically mean for them.  
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“Minus Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia, Yugoslavia would have a population of roughly 14 
million people of whom two-thirds would be Serbs.”47  Within the second option, the fear of the 
Muslims being treated like the Muslim Albanians in Kosovo became a foreseeable reality, so this 
too was a bad choice.   
Izetbegovic’s third option was to claim independence and secede from Yugoslavia with 
the intention of seeking international recognition.  This was ultimately the choice that was made, 
but the costs for this were extremely high.  The fourth and final choice was essentially to do 
nothing and see how things worked out.  Unfortunately, this had the potential of placing Bosnia 
in a situation which might lead to its use as a pawn in “a peace patched together with parts of this 
republic, redistributed as booty in the feud between Serbia and Croatia.”48  Clearly, none of these 
choices really had any potential for a beneficial outcome.  Thus, Izetbegovic was left to make the 
best decision he could for his republic. 
 What followed, according to Izetbegovic, was a policy of “appeasement” to the Serbians 
by the international powers.49  “Appeasement” is historically a loaded word, but it was precisely 
what the international community began to do in the face of Serbia’s aggression.  Thus, with no 
desire to become a part of a ‘Greater Serbia,” Bosnia seceded, declaring its independence on 
October 15, 1991.  Ali and Lifschultz said that this action was naïve, for “the Bosnian parliament 
had declared independence without adequate preparations to either secure or defend it” and, 
“instead, succumbed to a certain political naiveté and placed its faith in European and U.S. 
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commitments.”50  Regardless, it is still the position of this paper that this was the best decision 
for Bosnia, given the myriad of poorer choices.   
Under the circumstances, there was little else that Bosnia could do but place its hope in 
the international community.  Izetbegovic knew that his republic did not have the means to stand 
up against the Yugoslav army and militant Bosnian Serbs in the eastern portions of Bosnia.  For 
this reason, he quickly followed up his declaration with an appeal to the UN Security Council “to 
deploy peacekeeping forces in this Yugoslav republic as soon as possible to reduce the risk of a 
serious outbreak of ethnic violence.”51  What was happening in Croatia would soon spill over 
into Bosnia, and he was giving the international community advance warning that they could do 
something to stop the violence before it came.  Three months later, the Bosnian delegation was 
appealing again.  This time, however, the delegation was appealing “as fighting raged for a third 
day in the town of Bosanski Brod.”52  The opportunity for a cease fire had been missed, and 
things only got worse from here.   
 As war spread through Bosnia, the fury of the fighting and atrocities, both experienced 
and committed by the different groups, quickly escalated.  In all fairness, individuals from every 
side contributed to the cycle of violence.  The Serbs would commit the largest number of 
atrocities over the duration of the war, but the Croats would commit many of their own as well in 
their attempts to claim the second spot of power and logistical control.  Both were equally guilty 
of human rights violations as were many Bosnian Muslims.  However, the conflict between the 
Serbs and Croats was quickly recognized as the trigger of what would become an even larger 
war.  The U.S. Helsinki Commission, otherwise known as the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, already recognized the possibility of an escalation in violence in 
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February 1992.  U.S. Representative Jim Moody53 of Wisconsin presented what he had observed 
in meetings with the leaders of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia to the Commission and made it clear 
that the war already being fought in Croatia was “a continuation of an old conflict between Serbs 
and Croats,” and that it was “particularly important to prevent any fighting from spreading to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a spark could ignite a bloody war of endless reprisals, involving not 
only Serbs and Croatians, but also [Muslims].”54  Moody’s arguments demonstrated an 
understanding and communication of what was to come.  Thus, the U.S. and the international 
community again missed an opportunity to act forcefully at a point in which casualties still 
remained somewhat low, and they would continue to miss opportunities for the next few years. 
The Role of the United Nations 
The UN committed many errors in Bosnia, but it would be wrong to concentrate only on 
the errors.  The organization must be credited with trying to help and mediate matters in the 
Balkans.  The intentions of the UN were always good; the problems arose from its members.  
China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France and the United States are all 
permanent members with veto power, and Yugoslavia was historically connected to each of these 
powerful nations.  Complicating things further, France, Russia and the UK were all allies of 
Serbia in each of the World Wars.55  This caused the leaders of these nations to act reluctantly 
against Serbia despite its role as the aggressor.  Eventually leadership would change and these 
nations would turn against Serbia, but by that point hundreds of thousands had already died in 
former Yugoslavia.  Thus, their actions must be observed and critiqued in order to more clearly 
understand what went wrong.   
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 The United Nations’ role in Bosnia began well, but it did little to impede the carnage that 
transpired between April 1992 and December 1995.  Though the Bosnian War began as a civil 
war, it quickly escalated into a significant international concern with the introduction of UN 
Security Council resolutions and personnel.  The introduction of these economic and human 
elements intertwined the UN’s future with that of Bosnia, creating a more direct relationship 
between the actions of the UN and what was actually taking place in the country.    
The UNs’ main objectives in Bosnia were to contain the conflict and stop the atrocities 
from continuing by brokering a peace settlement between the three groups.  With the passing of 
UN security resolution 713 on the 25 September 1991, the first step by the UN towards stopping 
the violence was imposed with the creation of an arms embargo on the whole of the former 
Yugoslavia.56  Coupled with this policy was the requirement to bring the heads of the fighting 
factions to the negotiation table.  Movement in this direction began by inserting UN military 
liaisons into the country (Resolutions 727 and 740, 8 January and 7 February 1992) and 
eventually peacekeepers and dispersers of humanitarian aid in the form of UNPROFOR, or UN 
Protection Force (Resolution 743, 21 February 1992).  The next step was to create a no-fly zone 
over Bosnia (Resolution 781, 9 October 1992) followed by the creation of UN “safe zones” for 
those fleeing (Resolutions 819 and 824, 16 April and 6 May 1993)57.  This was followed by the 
establishment of an International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia to prosecute those violating 
humanitarian law (Resolution 827, 25 May 1993), yet each step would demonstrate itself to be 
insufficient, as the fighting continued for 2 more years after even these later resolutions.  Thus, 
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after all these things had failed, the UN created a rapid reaction force (Resolution 998, 16 June 
1995) and started strategic bombing as punishment for breaking the terms of agreements.58 
It is important to note how early the UN Security Council actually understood what was 
happening in Bosnia.  Resolution 787 first referenced “ethnic cleansing” taking place on 16 
November 1992.  Resolution 798 condemned the Serbs for the “systematic detention and rape of 
women” in Bosnia on 18 December 1992.  Also notable was UN soldiers were never given the 
right to fire if fired upon or the ability to use force to protect civilians which added to a sense of 
hopelessness for those on the ground in the country.  Over the years of the war, there were 
obviously many other actions and resolutions passed.  However, these were some of the most 
significant which bear mentioning because of their specific implications amidst the conflict.  All 
of these resolutions were necessary and good, but the timing in which they were implemented 
and the lack of action to back up their words was unacceptable.   
The negotiators made a mess of things from the start.  As arbitrators of the conflict, the 
Western diplomats were responsible for bringing about a swift and satisfactory end to the 
conflict.  Instead negotiations turned into a ”tragic game of procrastination.”59  Decision-making 
in conflicts such as the civil war in Yugoslavia require well thought out decisions to be made 
quickly.  Every day in which no action was taken meant more civilians and soldiers would die.  
This only got worse as the war spread to Bosnia.  “While Bosnia’s towns and villages were set 
ablaze, governments in Paris, London, New York, and Washington, unencumbered by any great 
sense of urgency, engaged in protracted, contentious and, in the end, sterile debate over the 
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options available to them to stop the war.”60  The stakes were high, and there should have been 
no doubt that something must be done when human rights violations became common 
knowledge.  The UN was formed in part to try and ensure that future generations would not 
suffer the same horrors of the earlier half of the twentieth century.  But poor decisions, inaction, 
and timidity on the part of the UN marred the peace process throughout the early nineties. 
 One of the first major mistakes to be made was recognizing the republics and accepting 
them into the UN as newly independent states but then doing nothing to protect them.  As they 
recognized the republics, they should also have “de-recognized” Yugoslavia.61  It no longer 
made sense to sustain actions against all of former Yugoslavia when half of its republics were 
recognized as independent and others were waiting for recognition.   
The first example of this complexity was the arms embargo.  With the passing of 
Resolution 713 of the United Nations Security Council, an arms embargo against all of 
Yugoslavia was declared.62  The embargo made sense while the nation continued to exist and be 
recognized as Yugoslavia, but as soon as the international community, especially those nations 
of the European Community and United States, began recognizing the individual republics as 
independent, it no longer made sense to clump them all together.   
From an outsider’s perspective, an arms embargo would seem like a wise approach to 
stemming the violence taking place within a conflict.  It would at least make it difficult for the 
sides involved to commit themselves to protracted campaigns of violence if they could not find 
an outside means to keep themselves armed.  However, the arms embargo had an adverse effect 
in Bosnia for the Bosnian Muslims, who suddenly lost their ability to arm and defend 
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themselves.  President Clinton understood this early on in his administration and the complexity 
of the situation which existed: 
There plainly is a civil war in Bosnia that is, among other things, a fight primarily 
between the Serbs and the Muslims but also involving the Croatians. It is complicated by 
the fact that Serbia, a separate country, has intervened in it, and complicated by the fact 
that the United Nations before Bosnia, the nation of Bosnia was even recognized, 
imposed an arms embargo in the area. But the practical impact of the arms embargo that 
the United Nations imposed was to give the entire weaponry of the Yugoslav Army to the 
Serbian Bosnians and deprive any kind of equal weaponry to the people fighting against 
them. So the global community had, not on purpose, but inadvertently, has had a huge 
impact on the outcome of that war in ways that have been very bad.63 
 
Another grave error was the length of time it took for the United Nations to send in a 
peacekeeping force, even after all the powers in conflict with each other had requested such a 
force.  The Yugoslav national government and the leaders of Slovenia and Croatia all asked for 
the United Nations to send a major peacekeeping operation in late 1991.  Bosnia asked for aid 
shortly after this as well.  However, in reply to these requests, UN officials determined that only 
a “token force” would be proposed as a “signal to the combatants that they must prove they 
really want peace.” 64  Their response was both counterintuitive and nonsensical as its unlikely 
that these government bodies would have asked for a peacekeeping mission if they did not 
indeed desire peace.  This was a golden opportunity for the United Nations to be able to place 
troops in the countries affected and work for a real peace.  The Security Council was in 
agreement with the Secretary General on this in initially proposing that small numbers of 
“military liaison officers” be sent in order to monitor the situation.65  This had a detrimental 
effect on the support of their allies.   
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The UN had hoped that enough peacekeepers would be deployed to deter Serb attacks, 
but President Clinton had made it clear that the United States would not send troops, and 
the European countries that had already deployed soldiers to Bosnia were reluctant to 
contribute many more peacekeepers to a failing UN effort.”66 
 
The inability of the Bosnian civilians to arm themselves and the initial lack of 
humanitarian troops to, at the very least, dampen Serbian aggression was only made worse by the 
fact that the Serbs were waging indiscriminate warfare on the civilian population of Bosnia, both 
Croatian Bosnians and Muslim Bosnians (even Bosnian Serbs that refused to leave their homes, 
friends, or family in areas like Sarajevo).  The Serbian artillery units above Sarajevo were able to 
shell the city with immunity because the city’s defenders lacked the weapons, and therefore the 
ability, to strike back.67  Once the Serbian military accomplished taking part of the city of 
Sarajevo they were able to use snipers as well.  These strategies were as successful in terrorizing 
the populace of Sarajevo as they were elsewhere. 
 The United Nations made another critical error involving troops when it refused to allow 
for its troops to act either in self-defense or in defense of the civilian population when terms of 
the negotiations were broken or when noncombatant’s lives were endangered.  This was further 
exacerbated by the fact that the negotiating parties were to adhere to an honor system with no 
threat of force or negative consequences in place should they break the terms of that system.  
Resolution 727 of the United Nations Security Council made this abundantly clear when it 
“urge[d] all parties to honour the commitments made at Geneva and Sarajevo with a view to 
effecting a complete cessation of hostilities” and “request[ed] all parties to take all necessary 
measures to ensure the safety of the personnel sent by the United Nations and of the members of 
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the European Community Monitoring Mission.”68  This resolution and the majority of 
resolutions following this one up until after the Srebrenica massacre were devoid of strong 
language or the presence of negative repercussions should terms be broken—a particularly 
striking contrast to the virulent language being used in propaganda by the Serbian leadership. 
 While negotiations were being held, propaganda in Serbia and elsewhere was making use 
of strong language and lies in order to incite action against those different from themselves.  In 
the face of such bold rhetoric, the UN’s use of language was noticeably weak.  There were no 
commands; there were only ‘urges’ and ‘requests’ which proved easy to ignore.  A lack of strong 
language or any threat of immediate repercussions only strengthened the resolve of Serbian 
leaders like General Mladic who then took it upon themselves to act with even greater aggression 
against the civilian population of Bosnia.  Throughout this entire process, the UN continued to 
dream of brokering a peace agreement, and the Bosnian Muslims and their fellow citizens that 
held to the belief that a multicultural, pluralistic society could and should persist continued to 
die.   
 Two years later, in August of 1993, this sentiment remained the same as Clinton stated, 
“the message is, first of all, that the allies are determined to protect the United Nations forces 
there, determined to secure the humanitarian relief program. And the other message is that we 
would very much—all of us--like to see a successful agreement and a fair peace agreement that 
can then be enforced.” 69  Enforcement would only come once terms of peace were made 
acceptable to all parties. After two years of negotiations and war, there were still no 
accommodations for UN troops on the ground to act with force when Serbian forces disrupted 
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their ability to disperse aid.  The distribution of humanitarian aid in crisis situations today is one 
of the great humanitarian victories of the current era, but the terms by which the troops were able 
to distribute it while simultaneously allowing acts of genocide to continue unchecked did not line 
up with the purposes of the UN and one reason for which it was created.   
David Rieff questioned the reasoning of this dichotomy.  He felt that “any future moral 
authority in the United Nations could hope to exercise depended on its doing something to help 
in Bosnia.”  After all, it seemed “incongruous that UN soldiers and UNHCR convoy drivers 
risked and sometimes lost their lives to bring in food to isolated areas, but steadfastly refused to 
silence the guns that were causing the emergency.”70  The politics of creating a peace agreement 
appeared to be the very thing which allowed peace to remain unattainable.  The environment 
became increasingly difficult for the UN soldiers.  Even if had been given the right to fight when 
necessary they “were almost always outnumbered and underarmed, and they never knew whether 
they should return fire.  If they did, they might move from being impartial peacekeepers to armed 
participants, and not only would the mighty Serbs turn on them, but their superiors at UN 
headquarters in New York would be furious.”71  With a UN Security Council directive in place, 
nobody on the ground could fire a shot, and there would be negative repercussions for anyone 
who did.  The Serbian leaders taking part in negotiations realized this and began using it to their 
advantage knowing that the UN peacekeepers were not there to stop them as long as such 
directives continued.  The UN would continue to pursue diplomatic means towards peace with 
little measurable change in policy despite this continued aggression by the forces in Bosnia.  This 
led countries like the United States to saying they could have no part in placing their own troops 
on the ground there in assisting with the humanitarian aid process. 
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 What remained more striking than anything else in this conflict, however, was the 
duration of the peace process.  The Bosnian War lasted four years with little measurable progress 
in the peace negotiations or limiting of violence on the ground for the first couple years.  This led 
to individuals like Warren Zimmerman, and others to question how functional the United 
Nations could actually be in determining and endorsing policy in regional conflicts.  Time was 
imperative in bringing the violence to an end as long as individuals were losing their lives, but 
the process was neither timely nor succinct.  Speaking on the nature of diplomacy in this conflict, 
Zimmerman reasoned that, 
Those who practice diplomacy need constantly to be reminded of the human damage 
their efforts, or lack of them, can cause.  For three years of the Bosnian war, the Western 
countries had attempted to rebuff the Serbian aggressors, bloated by their use of force, 
without making them fear that force would in turn be used against them.  Western 
diplomacy was reduced to a kind of cynical theater, a pretense of useful activity, a way of 
disguising a lack of will.  Diplomacy without force became an unloaded weapon, 
impotent and ridiculous.72 
 
Though he was not alone in this sentiment, it was disturbing to hear a former ambassador speak 
of the delineations in such a way.   
 One of the gravest errors made by the intervening powers was eventually rewarding 
Croatia and Serbia with land they had claimed outside their own republic’s borders.  This 
occurred in early 1993 after the new Clinton Administration supported former Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign Secretary David Owen’s “settlement based on ten 
ethnic provinces and accepting for the first time that territory seized by Serbian forces in their 
campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ would be recognized as a fait accompli.”73  From any angle, this 
was an unfortunate decision, and it soon became clear to those who put the plan together that this 
was the case.  “The cheery optimism of Vance and Owen quickly proved to be a chimera.  As 
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predicted, their plan provided a perverse rationale for one of the most violent phases of land 
grabbing and ‘ethnic cleansing’ yet seen in the Balkan war ‘by tempting the owners of the 
national provinces to full possession of their mini-states.’”74  Rewarding aggression logically led 
to more aggression.  Such decisions encouraged the Serbian leadership by revealing that when it 
pushed, there would be no push back from the international community.  Thus, there was no 
incentive for Milosevic to back off.  This also encouraged Tudjman to pursue his own cut of 
Bosnia for Croatia.  In all these decisions, Bosnia was the loser.  In defense of Vance and Owen, 
they were making their decision based on the actions, or more accurately, inactions, of the 
nations they were representing.  “Yes, it was an imperfect plan, but it was the only one possible 
without military intervention.”75  Thus, the negotiators’ jobs were made difficult not only by the 
parties at war but by those they were representing in trying to bring about a peace agreement. 
President Clinton was willing to acknowledge that the process was not without fault.  
When asked by a reporter in May 1994 whether the chain of command in and between the UN 
and NATO was too cumbersome or bureaucratic, President Clinton admitted that it was a 
problem the UN was working on.  However, Clinton also asserted a valid argument for looking 
at the proceedings with grace in light of the international organizations “trying to do something 
that has not before been done: put NATO in the service of preserving the peace in Europe 
outside the NATO membership area for the first time ever and to work with the United Nations 
when the United Nations forces are on the ground, but not combatants themselves.”76  The reality 
that the UN was on the ground while NATO controlled the skies made things difficult.  Initially 
this made sense while peace was trying to be achieved without the shedding of blood.  Yet the 
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time it took for the UN to move from negotiating peace to penalizing acts of aggression was a 
long road, leaving the Bosnians to bear the heartbreak in the interim.  However exhausting the 
process was for those taking part in negotiations, it is important to remember that these 
negotiations were exponentially more difficult on the victims in Bosnia as events continued 
without significant change.   
Few understood this better than a little girl who lived through much of the siege of 
Sarajevo.  Credited as the Anne Frank of the Bosnian War, Zlata Filipovic expressed her 
frustration with the way politics were being handled.  In November 1992, she recorded in her 
diary that there was “nothing new on the political front” as the negotiations and resolutions were 
passed yet appeared to do little to impact the lives of those within Sarajevo. Instead they were 
“dying, freezing, starving, crying, parting with [their] friends, leaving [their] loved ones” while 
the ‘kids’ played politics. 77   Tragically, these negotiations continued for two more years at the 
cost of thousands more lives lost. 
 The true nature of the UN was revealed in its role in former Yugoslavia.  It revealed itself 
to be made up of peacekeepers, not peacemakers, even when basic human rights were being 
violated and established reports of genocide and mass rape were being delivered to them and 
reported in the news.  The UN would later show another major flaw of their policy when they 
held the lives of their own troops above the lives of those individuals they were being sent in to 
protect as virtually every UN Security Council resolution called upon all the parties to “ensure 
the safety of United Nations and other personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance.”78  A significant test of this resolve came at Srebrenica in 1995. 
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 Srebrenica is important to mention because it represents the location of one of the 
greatest massacres of Bosnian Muslims in the war.  It is also important because “the fall of 
Srebrenica changed everything.  It offended the Western nations and in some way made the 
tragedy personal.”79  The greatest hardship of this massacre was that it occurred in an area that 
had been declared a UN safe zone.  This led to “debate over complicity in genocide on the part of 
UN personnel.”80 
What is undeniable is that when Srebrenica was bombarded on 9 and 10 July, the Dutch 
UN contingent defending the ‘safe area’ put up no resistance.  Around thirty of their 
number were held hostage at the time, but they also lacked backup support, equipment or 
the will to impede the Serbs in any way.81 
 
 It would be easy to point the finger of liability at the Dutch soldiers for allowing the 
genocide and ethnic cleansing which ensued at Srebrenica to occur, but they were not solely 
responsible.   They were peacekeeping soldiers of the United Nations under orders to keep the 
peace without taking sides.  This massacre revealed the UN to be incapable of bringing about 
peace as long as its structure remained the same.   
 Action was quickly taken by the UN following the events at Srebrenica, but by that time 
over 8,000 Muslim men and boys had been murdered in Srebrenica alone.  Though similar 
atrocities were and had been taking place elsewhere for many years, this was unique in that it 
was within a UN declared “safe area.”  Srebrenica was a major reality check for the international 
community on the limitations of remaining neutral.  It was difficult to accept that it would take a 
horrific example like Srebrenica to get the UN to finally flex its muscles and say enough was 
enough and that the many other deaths prior to this had not been reason enough to act.  As a 
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body created to keep the peace and preserve justice following World War II, the UN failed in 
Bosnia and the rest of former Yugoslavia to uphold the basic laws on which it was built.  The 
UN has learned valuable lessons from Bosnia, but the Bosnian people paid a tragically high cost 
for that which was learned much too late.82 
 That Srebrenica even happened was a consequence of the greatest mistake the UN made; 
the mistake of allowing too much time to pass before major actions were taken to stop the 
Serbian aggressors.  The worst fears of those whom had speculated what could happen if war 
came to Bosnia were realized when it finally did in April 1992, and time became the greatest ally 
of leaders like Karadzic and Mladic.  The Bosnian Serb army, and what remained of a 
predominantly Serbian Yugoslav army, was initially quick to sweep in and overwhelm those that 
stood in their way.  With superior armaments and military leadership experience they were able 
to overrun more than half of the country.  And afterward, they began undermining all the work 
that had taken place in Bosnia’s prior forty years as a part of Yugoslavia in moving towards 
becoming a more pluralistic society.  The long negotiation process that followed allowed for 
sniper and mortar fire to slowly destroy both the lives and beliefs of a population that still 
desired a society in which the different ethnic groups could coexist and thrive together.  This 
then made it possible for the stronger and more corrupt to move in and dictate the future of 
Bosnia once the war finally ended.   
United Nations and the United States 
 
 At the time, one of the major questions regarding the crisis in the Balkans was, “[Could] 
the U.S. and Europe allow a military crackdown in Yugoslavia?  The event would certainly 
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undermine the whole concept of European security and stability.”83  This was true.  Had no 
containment policies been attempted, the war could have spread outside the borders of 
Yugoslavia, upsetting European stability.  The last thing the U.S. and Europe wanted was an 
unstable dictatorship in Europe after seeing the Soviet Union finally fall.  Thus, it follows that a 
peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis was desirable.   
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and with it an end to the Cold War, it comes as no 
surprise that much of Eastern Europe was thrown into chaos.  Though Yugoslavia had existed 
apart from the Soviet Union, the vacuum left by the absence of a suitable strong handed dictator 
to take Tito’s place after his death allowed the fires of nationalism to make their way into its 
republics.  Some, like Milosevic in Serbia and to a lesser extent Tudjman in Croatia, used 
nationalism as a means to unite their entire ethnic group together in one border much like 
Germany had done earlier in the century.  Milosevic appeared more like the communist dictators 
of old in his pursuit of achieving a Greater Serbia by using the means given him as leader of the 
state.  Others, like Izetbegovic in Bosnia, had a more multiethnic vision of nationalism and their 
pursuit of a future apart from communism united them and other nations and republics pursuing 
democracy to the national interests of the U.S.  While the Cold War was over, the U.S. goal of 
spreading democracy was not.   
 Thus, the United States approach to dealing with the Bosnian War possessed the same 
two major objectives as the United Nation’s and NATO’s.  Repeatedly, Clinton stated the two 
clearest objectives to be that “we want the conflict to be contained, and we want the slaughter 
and the ethnic cleansing to stop.”84  He also maintained that this would require working with the 
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allies within the UN and NATO regardless of his agreement or disagreement with their policies.  
In doing so, Clinton tied the U.S. to the UN and Europe in whatever decisions would play out in 
Bosnia starting early in 1993.  Things would not change until 1995. 
 There were a number of key changes which took place in 1995 in leadership, firepower, 
and policy—turning the tide for the U.S. involving itself in Bosnia.  Francois Mitterrand was 
replaced by Jacques Chirac as the president of France on May 17 of that year.85  He then “talked 
with John Major about the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force, an elite French-British unit, far 
better armed with much heavier weapons, which, with American air support and helicopters, 
could move quickly and strike the Serbs with genuine force if they violated any more 
agreements.”86  When Major agreed, this put the two nations which had stood most firmly in the 
way of stronger action in Yugoslavia on the side of politicians in the U.S. that wanted to be more 
forceful in responding to Serb aggression.   
Leadership also changed hands over command of airpower from the UN, which had been 
too Serbocentric under Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and was therefore “compromised,” to 
NATO which saw Bosnia as a part of its sphere of influence where it could not afford to fail.87  
Taking the UN out of the hierarchy of airpower simplified the command structure making it 
easier and quicker to call in air support. 
In addition, Croatian forces which had been trained by former U.S. army officers “could 
for the first time match the Serbs in firepower.”88  The Serbs did well early in the war largely 
because of their superiority in firepower.  As long as they held that edge, neither the Croatians 
nor the Bosnian Muslims could stand up to them in battle.   
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 In the U.S., Bob Dole, the Senate majority leader at the time, was “advocating a 
resolution that called for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.  He appeared to have the votes 
in both the House and the Senate to pass the resolution, and in case the president vetoed it, the 
votes to override the veto.”89  This meant that Clinton would have the backing of Congress if he 
decided to pursue a more active role in Bosnia.  The changes in Europe also made it possible to 
realistically consider a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo and united military front.   
Most importantly, the U.S. also finally possessed the leadership and will to act decisively.  
Clinton was a strong domestic policy president, but weak in foreign policy—his proficiency in 
which was limited to that of his advisers.  By 1995, there were three key individuals whom had 
joined his team of advisers that made the difference in Bosnia.  The first individual was General 
John Shalikashvili.  He became the head of the joint chiefs in fall of 1993 replacing Colin 
Powell.  Over the next few years Shalikashvili proved himself to be a highly capable leader and 
made his greatest mark when he proposed going directly to a massive air campaign with the 
objective of taking out the Serbs’ air defense systems, “thereby sending them the first of what 
might be a series of messages.”90  This would not be a small retaliatory gesture to Serb 
aggression.  It would be a firm statement of what would come in the future if they continued to 
act as they had throughout the war to this point.  Shalikashvili was not intimidated. 
The second individual was William “Bill” Perry who became Clinton’s Secretary of 
Defense in February of 1994.  Perry was a highly intelligent individual with a Ph.D. in 
mathematics who had served as undersecretary for research and engineering under Carter, and he 
proposed a number of changes for both the U.S. and UN military tactics in Bosnia.91  The first 
proposition he made was similar to Shalikashvili’s in calling for “massive high-technology 
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bombing” or “carpet bombing.”  This would not be like the inefficient carpet bombing of World 
War II.  Instead, it would be a strong assault on Serb positions using precision bombing 
technology to overwhelm them with their ability to bomb accurately and with great magnitude.  
However, the aerial bombing would only be one part of the assault. 
Another tactical change was the consolidation of the many scattered, smaller units of UN 
troops into “units of a thousand men or more” with sufficient firepower to hold off the Serbs 
until air cover arrived.  This would take away the ability of the Serb forces to capture UN troops 
and hold them as hostages in order to make demands.  “Meanwhile, a team of American, British, 
and French generals would meet with the Bosnian Serb leaders to warn them that if they tried 
anything from now on, we would pound them as they had never been pounded before.”92  These 
tactics would show that the years of bowing to Serb aggression were over.  The international 
community was finally empowered to control the situation. 
The final figure was the biggest advocate of Bosnia and the plight of the people there and 
proved to be the greatest hero of this tragedy on the U.S. side of things.  Richard Holbrooke was 
considered by some to be the “most talented candidate” for secretary of state when Clinton was 
looking to first fill the position, but he had the most enemies of any of the candidates.93  
Holbrooke was not afraid to step on toes, but Clinton did not want a secretary of state that would 
push him too hard in foreign policy.  Thus, he lost out on this position and others having to settle 
for ambassador to Germany.  Holbrooke did not disappear, however, and following Srebrenica 
he was called on to take a leading role in Bosnia.  Despite his faults which made him could make 
him a political liability at times, Holbrooke “was also decisive and audacious, willing to do some 
things wrong in order to do other things right, willing above all to take risks for policies he 
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believed in.”94  He believed that things could be different in Bosnia, and he made them so.  Each 
of these individuals and the changes which took place in the personnel and postures of the 
leaders in Europe ensured that the intervention in Bosnia would be different in 1995. 
Media Framing 
 Throughout the Bosnian War, the media played an integral part in reporting what was 
taking place in Bosnia to those that were not present there.  Out of these reports, opinions were 
formed about how the U.S. should be involved.  However, these reports were not perfect in their 
coverage of the conflict. 
 Public opinion played a large role in the development of the United States’ foreign 
policy with Bosnia throughout the conflict.  Newspaper articles and televised broadcasts led 
average U.S. citizens to develop a conscience for the injustices occurring in a country which they 
otherwise might never have heard of or cared about.  Ask around today and most people still 
have no idea where Bosnia is.  Yet in a democratic nation like the United States, public polls 
play a significant role in the policy of the administration in office.  At the time of the Bosnian 
War, “the two most important developments in American politics were the use of polling and 
television advertising, both of them joined together in zeroing in on and then manipulating what 
the voting public thought at a given moment.95  With the advent of CNN, news was accessible 
twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, and Bosnia was a big story.  Perhaps a more 
poignant question was whether what was being seen was an accurate representation of what was 
happening.  Historian James J. Sadkovich did not believe so. 
In reality, victims who died on a weekend, or far from TV minicams, or in a forest deep 
inside Bosnia made little or no sound, because few journalists worked weekends—or 
from 7:00 P.M. in the evening to 10:00 A.M. the next morning, or in Bosnia’s forests; TV 
journalists have a window from 10:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. when they gather news for the 
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prime-time slot.  Journalists stayed in major cities because access to occupied areas was 
limited.  By limiting access, the Serbians diverted more attention to Croatian and Bosnian 
territories.  As a result, human rights violations and war crimes by Croatians and 
Bosnians were exaggerated by UN officials and a media anxious for copy, whereas 
genocide in Serbian areas was not even reported—unless the potential or actual victim 
was an American.96 
 
Just as national interest had played a role in judging whether Bosnia had anything to offer the 
U.S. or its allies, the concern for U.S. soldiers, journalists, and civilians also prevailed over the 
sufferings of the Bosnian people experiencing the worst of the tragedy.  And it was no different 
for the international forces there.  The fact is that “wars are fought not only with arms, but also 
with words.”97  However, words can also lead to inaction.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand the differences, if any, which existed in how the war in Bosnia was being portrayed 
compared to other conflicts going on around the same time, such as the war in Iraq.  Differences 
in definition could elicit completely opposite reactions from the public. 
 When the war in Bosnia broke out, the Bush administration and media took the stance 
that this war did not represent a conflict which the U.S. could entangle itself in.  For Bush, 
Bosnia was different from the Persian Gulf.  In justifying U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf, 
Bush and the media acclaimed the ‘American’ ideals of justice and freedom to win public 
support.  The presence of oil did not hurt either.  These same ideals were not used in regard to 
Bosnia.  Clinton took a different stance in saying, “I am appalled by what has happened there; I 
am saddened; I am sickened.  And I know that our ability to do anything about it is somewhat 
limited.”98  Neither presidents liked what was happening in Bosnia, nor were they initially 
willing to take a strong stance in proposing that action follow words.  Essentially, the media was 
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a major factor in the Bosnian War in reporting what was happening to those who were watching 
it from afar.  However, the media was limited in what it could show by forces within Bosnia and 
abroad, and the politicians of the U.S. put their own spin on what was taking place in order to 
justify their actions, or lack their of. 
United States Involvement 
One major question often posed in situations requiring international response in today’s 
world is, “What does our country have to gain by getting involved?”  Until moral grounds were 
given for the United States to involve itself, the U.S. had nothing of strategic value to gain out of 
the war in Bosnia.  The Soviet Union was gone, so there was no need for Yugoslavia to act as a 
thorn in the side of the Soviet Union and communist solidarity anymore.  Bosnia also had little to 
offer the U.S. in terms of natural resources, like oil, which offered a stark contrast between the 
Persian Gulf War and the war in Bosnia.  As the U.S. weighed the costs and benefits of engaging 
in this overseas crisis, it must have been difficult to see any scenario in which there might be 
something to gain.   This was different for the Europeans who were not only closer in proximity 
but also saw this as their own special moment in history.  “The Europeans, eager to show the 
force and muscle of a newly united continent, were anxious to play a decisive role on this issue.  
Later it would be clear that they had greatly overestimated their influence, but there was no 
doubt about their enthusiasm for the task at first.”99  The Europeans also greatly overestimated 
their unity, but they answered the call of the Secretary General for troops and were a part of 
UNPROFOR when it was established in February 1992 by Resolution 743 of the Security 
Council.  And “because they had troops on the ground in Bosnia and the crisis was taking place 
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in their backyards, the Europeans had significant stakes in the conflict.”100  Thus, initially the 
U.S. took a back seat. 
During this time, there were tough decisions for the U.S. as well with their own 
government in transition.  Risk was involved for the U.S. in determining whether it should push 
the UN to try something different or let the UN and European Community continue to take the 
lead in Bosnia.  The collapse of Yugoslavia and the start of the Bosnian War aligned with an 
election year (1992) and became a part of the debate between George H. W. Bush, who was 
running for reelection, and Bill Clinton.  When Clinton won, a new administration with a new set 
of advisors moved in and had to decide whether to continue the prior administration’s policy in 
Bosnia or plot a new course.  Therefore, the two administrations must be dealt with separately in 
terms of why they would or would not have wanted to get involved.   
When events in Yugoslavia began to unravel in 1991, the possibility of intervening was 
extremely unattractive to the Bush administration, and the president and his advisers had a 
number of reasons for not wanting to involve themselves in the conflict.  Dennis Ross, an 
American diplomat and author with extensive experience working with both republican and 
democrat presidencies, gave five reasons for why action in Bosnia was not desirable.  First, the 
United States’ main focus was on the unraveling Soviet Union.  Second, the administration felt 
that it was a European problem which should be solved by the Europeans.  Third, there was a 
fear that intervention would require a strong military action which seemed unlikely to gain public 
approval at the time.  Fourth, the administration was tired from having moved from one foreign 
policy situation to the next throughout the term.  Lastly, because there had been so much 
emphasis placed on foreign policy, there were now many “domestic realities” which needed to 
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be tended to before committing the U.S. to yet another foreign endeavor.101  George C. Herring, 
a historian and leading authority on U.S. foreign relations, echoed all of these reasons and added 
two more: Yugoslavia was no longer geopolitically significant now that the Cold War had ended, 
and “memories of Vietnam still held sway.”102  These were legitimate reasons for a president to 
not want to get involved.  Added to this was the complexity of an election which President Bush 
hoped to win.  This was a less legitimate reason from a moral standpoint, but it still weighed into 
the equation due to the nature of U.S. politics.  Regardless of whether one would consider these 
valid reasons, they influenced the Bush administration’s foreign policy. 
The Secretary of State under President Bush, James Baker, revealed the U.S. position on 
Bosnia early on.  He stated that “while the United States wanted to see Yugoslavia’s territorial 
integrity preserved, it would welcome any federal restructuring accepted by the republics.”103  So 
the U.S. was willing to accept changes if they were unanimously agreed upon by all the 
republics.  Baker also displayed an understanding of just how far things had deteriorated.  
“Logical argument simply will not work at this stage, when ethnic and nationalist passions 
suppressed by 45 years of Communist rule are exploding to the surface.”104  Secretary of State, 
Lawrence Eagleburger, also presented the U.S. position clearly when he said, “We would be 
strongly opposed to any use of force or intimidation to settle political differences, change 
external or internal borders, block democratic change, or impose a nondemocratic unity.”105  The 
use of force by any of the republics to effect change was deemed unacceptable, but the 
impending violence revealed these threats to be empty.  The wording was strong but 
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noncommittal, and a Balkan crisis which had moved beyond resolving with a “logical argument” 
required a firm commitment to have any impact.  Perhaps President Bush would have acted had 
he won a second term, instead threats were as far as his administration ventured.  Thus, the 
situation continued to be unresolved leading into the Clinton Administration. 
It also seemed odd that the Bush administration was not taking a strong stance on Bosnia 
due to the action taken in the Persian Gulf, though there are few comparisons which can be made 
between the Persian Gulf War and the war in Yugoslavia.  The Bush Administration acted 
quickly and powerfully in responding to Saddam Hussein’s aggressive action against Kuwait.  
“Aggressors must not be allowed to profit from their conquests.  That’s the principle President 
Bush soundly invoked to mobilize the world against Saddam Hussein’s seizure of Kuwait.  The 
lesson seems to have been entirely lost on Slobodan Milosevic.”106  The Bush Administration 
changed to a more timid position in Yugoslavia when it was determined that the US would only 
“try to use its influence to limit further expansion by the Serbs” despite their role as 
aggressors.107  The administration continued to merely threaten while following the lead of the 
European Community.  Eventually steps which did not require force were taken to try to stop the 
fighting.  These took the forms of economic sanctions and an arms embargo against Yugoslavia, 
which were supported by the U.S. and Canada, and the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia as independent nations.  However, the efforts continued to do little to stop the aggression 
of Milosevic and his Serbian Yugoslav army.  The fact of the matter was that there was a stark 
difference between the United States’ position in the Persian Gulf and its position in Yugoslavia, 
and many at the time, and many today, point to the fact that the Persian Gulf possessed oil, and 
Bosnia did not.   
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Whether the public is aware of it or not, national interest plays a large role in creating 
foreign policy.  The U.S. has a large national interest in ensuring that oil continues to flow into 
the country.  All one has to do is look at the U.S. public’s response to high gas prices in order 
understand that the price of oil has a strong impact on public sentiment.  Individuals like Lee 
Hamilton, the Democratic Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs from 1993-
1995, argued against lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and laughed on television “when he 
noted that it was unfortunate for the Bosnians that unlike Kuwait there was no oil in their country 
which might have made Bosnia’s resources, if not its population, a strategic interest to the 
US.”108  Many believed that “if Kuwait were not rich in oil, the West would not have rushed half 
a million soldiers to the Persian Gulf,” and they were probably right.109  National and strategic 
interests are essential ingredients in determining foreign policy.  The United States had a 
strategic interest in Yugoslavia while Tito was in power because the Soviet Union still existed as 
competition.  The Soviet Union’s collapse took away the one real chip that Yugoslavia had in 
keeping the attention of the U.S. and its foreign policy.    
Under the Bush administration, the U.S. leadership also over emphasized what its role in 
Yugoslavia would have to look like.  Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
under Bush, said that intervention in Bosnia would require an “all-or-nothing” attack with clear 
objectives and a desire to win quickly.110  Haunted by the shadow of Vietnam, Powell could not 
get past the what-ifs.  The most frightening of questions being “what would happen if the Serbs 
suffered heavy initial casualties from our high-tech weaponry, but instead of folding their hand 
and bowing to pressure, acted like the proud warrior nation they were long reputed to be, broke 
their forces down into smaller guerrilla-like units, and used the harsh terrain to their advantage 
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and continued to attack their neighbors?”111  The U.S. could not afford another Vietnam, so 
“Powell deliberately exaggerated the number of troops112 that would be needed” in order to scare 
off advocates of intervention.113  The war was eventually brought to an end without this ‘all-or-
nothing’ approach, so this was not entirely accurate.  However, had the U.S. acted unilaterally in 
bringing an end to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, a ground force would have been required 
along with the air power it eventually did utilize, so Powell might have been proven correct.  But 
the U.S. under Clinton chose to work with the international community instead, so this option 
never received a high priority.   
Clinton received a lot of praise for the eventual end of the Bosnian War due to his 
position as president when it happened, but his administration was prone to equal amounts of 
unsupported talking points and inaction as the prior administration.   Had it not been for the 
people Clinton eventually surrounded himself with, his administration may have failed in 
Yugoslavia as well.  This was largely due to how much emphasis Clinton placed on foreign 
policy.  When comparing the two presidents, Halberstam pointed to their stances on foreign 
policy as a major difference between the two.  “For Bush, foreign policy had been his raison 
d’être.  For Clinton, it was an inconvenience, something that might pull him away from his 
primary job at hand—domestic issues, above all the economy.”114  For Herring, all one had to do 
was look at two of his closest advisers and where their experience came from to understand this.  
“His top foreign policy advisers, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher, a protégé of Cyrus Vance, came mainly out of the liberal Democratic 
mold—burned by Vietnam, nervous about unilateral intervention, committed to working through 
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the UN and other international organizations.”115  These advisers would not push Clinton on 
foreign policy.  As previously examined, it was only when other advisers were brought in that 
Clinton’s administration took action in Bosnia. 
The United States held a new and unique position entering the 1990s.  As the world’s 
sole superpower, and possessing the largest, most powerful military, the U.S. possessed the 
military might to act alone in areas like Bosnia if a firm action was required.  This placed it in a 
great position of power and influence.  There were also a number of reasons for wanting to get 
involved.  Wayne Bert found these by looking at members of the administration.   
Peter Tarnoff, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in the Clinton 
Administration gave three reasons the U.S. had an interest in events in Yugoslavia: to 
prevent the spread of fighting and the resultant instability that could threaten our allies or 
Russia; to stem the flow of refugees, provide humanitarian relief and stop the slaughter; 
and for the U.S. to maintain a leadership role in European affairs.116 
 
Yet there was never the will to act or place U.S. soldiers into harm’s way.  For instance, public 
opinion had soured quickly in Somalia in 1993 with footage of a U.S. soldier’s corpse being 
dragged through the street despite earlier public support for intervention.  Nineteen soldiers died 
in Somalia, and most consider the mission there to be “in all ways a fiasco.”117  With this recent 
action in mind, public opinion could only be trusted to remember the most recent actions 
broadcast.   
 In Bosnia and elsewhere, Clinton made it clear that “when we commit ourselves to 
working with our neighbors, through NATO, through the U.N., through the Organization of 
American States, through any other group, that we have to be prepared not to always have our 
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way just prevail overnight.”118  Despite disagreeing with the way in which some decisions were 
being made, like Bush before him, Clinton was willing to acquiesce to the Europeans since the 
situation in Bosnia had the most potential to affect them.  This humility in leadership earned the 
U.S. credibility and good standing internationally and ensured that the U.S. would not lose 
backing in other areas of the world where it possessed the backing of the UN and NATO such as 
the economic sanctions which existed against Iraq.   
International power and perception were not the only objectives the U.S. under Clinton 
pursued.  Another primary goal of the U.S. was to ensure that the crisis in the Balkans would not 
become “a broader European conflict, especially one that could threaten our NATO allies or 
undermine the transition of former Communist states to peaceful democracies.”119  Unrest in the 
Balkans, the “powder keg” of Europe, was not to be taken lightly.  Events there had led to major 
European conflicts in the past, thus any effort to contain the conflict was encouraged.  This was 
due to the U.S. and UN being concerned that the ethnic cleansing taking place in Bosnia “could 
have other practical consequences in other nearby regions where the same sorts of ethnic 
tensions exist[ed].”120  Bosnia and Croatia were not the sole possessors of ethnically diverse 
populations with troubled pasts.  
The other republics of former Yugoslavia had experienced population diffusion 
throughout their recent and distant histories leading to majority and minority ethnic populations 
being found within their borders, and these groups could just as easily have recalled accounts of 
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former sins committed by those outside their ethnic group.  This was the case in all the republics 
of former Yugoslavia as it was in many of the nations that once fell behind the Iron Curtain, and 
the international community could not afford a domino effect taking place sending Europe once 
again into chaos and ruin.  Thus, it was in everyone’s best interests to see this unrest end here 
and find a way to bring the opposing groups to the table together to work out their differences 
and grievances and move toward reconciliation.  Unfortunately, there is still much work to be 
done even today and will be for years to come.  Currently, there remains a UN military presence 
in the country because of this.  Since 2004, there has been a European Union led contingent of 
1600 UN troops present within Bosnia with the possibility of that number rising to 7000 in case 
hostilities ever arose again.  Known as EUFOR ALTHEA121, their charter lasts until November 
of 2011. 
According to Clinton, the U.S. also wanted to ensure that NATO remained “a credible 
force for peace in the post-cold-war era.”122  As “the world’s greatest military alliance,” NATO 
could not afford to sit idly by while the slaughter continued to happen in Bosnia without losing 
some credibility.  And NATO’s charter echoed the UN charter in its purpose “to settle any 
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security and justice [were] not endangered.”  Therefore, they agreed to 
assist the UN in monitoring that sanctions were being complied with at a meeting in Helsinki on 
July 10, 1992 which then set a precedent for them to assist throughout the ensuing four years of 
the war and after.  They would later be put to work controlling the skies over Bosnia with the 
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passing on October 9, 1992 of UN Security Council Resolution 781 creating a no-fly zone for 
non-NATO or UN flights and the eventual strategic bombing campaign against the Bosnian 
Serbs and Yugoslav army regulars on the ground in Bosnia.   
 It would be too harsh to say that the actions of those taking the lead at the end of the 
twentieth century in resolving situations like those in Bosnia and elsewhere made their decisions 
lightly.  Clinton put it best towards the end of his time as president when he said that: 
Too often we forget that 1989 was also a time of grave uncertainty about the future. 
There were doubts about NATO's future, reinforced later by its slowness to confront evil 
in Bosnia and Croatia. There were fears that the EU's efforts to come closer together 
would either fail or, succeeding, would fatally divide Europe and the United States. The 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe feared becoming a gray zone of poverty and 
insecurity. Many wondered if Russia was headed for a Communist backlash or a 
nationalist coup.123 
 
Essentially, the future was anything but certain in the 1990s.  Nobody knew how events were 
going to unfold or whether the world would be a more stable and united place.  Everyone could 
hope for that, but it was clear that the leaders of the “free world” were anything but certain that 
that was the future to come or even whether that was where there decisions were leading.   
 No conflict is ever the same, but there are lessons which can be learned and applied 
elsewhere.  This should always be the stance of bodies like the United Nations, NATO and the 
United States.  By always looking to improve themselves and the actions they take, they can 
pursue positive actions with more beneficiary returns in the future.  Though much of this paper 
has focused on detailing what was missed by those in the international community in being able 
to determine what was to come in Yugoslavia, it is worth reiteration that, despite failures like 
these, there were also successes which should be examined in order to learn how better to deal 
with crises such as the Bosnia one in the future.   
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 The situation was not an easy one for those involving themselves with the pursuit of 
peace in Bosnia and the rest of a crumbling Yugoslavia.  One major hurdle the international 
community faced was the recent collapse of the Soviet Union and an end to the Cold War.  “It 
(Bosnia) ha[d] become for better or worse a paradigm for the problem of regional conflict 
management in the post-Cold-War era.”124  The Cold War had defined international relations 
since the end of World War II.  Thus, the crisis in Yugoslavia represented one of the first 
attempts at resolving a conflict in a Communist nation without the threat of the Soviet Union 
looming.  The United States now stood alone as the sole superpower in the world, but the 
government was still hesitant to act out unilaterally.  This was made clear early on by President 
Bush as he declared, “We are not the world’s policeman.”125  After all, the country “was more 
powerful and more influential than ever before, but it was looking inward.”126  With Clinton’s 
focus on domestic policy, there appeared to be little to be gained by the U.S. intervening in the 
Balkans.  It was only after the moral grounds to intercede became politically feasible that Bosnia 
became interesting.  Ultimately, Wayne Bert put it best in stating that the U.S. and others 
involved were “unprepared to pay the price necessary to prevent or stop” the genocide taking 
place in Yugoslavia or any of the other countries like Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia and Sudan that 
were experiencing conflict.127 
Positive Contributions from the U.S. in Ending the Conflict 
 Though the U.S. interceded late, they did eventually respond and help bring the conflict 
to an end.  Had the U.S. continued to remain out of the conflict, the war may have gone on for 
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even longer with the Europeans unable or unwilling to take action themselves.  However, the 
U.S. only acted when it became politically feasible to break with the European consensus and 
pursue a new agenda.   “In the fall of 1994, there may have been reason enough to stand firm 
with the allies because the domestic pressure before the midterm elections had temporarily 
changed the relative payoffs for collaboration on the administration’s preferred policy and 
collaboration on a compromise.”128  Politics again played a factor in the decision to hold off on 
taking any action in Bosnia.  Clinton only pushed for a change in procedure following the events 
at Srebrenica when “nonconfrontation became politically untenable.”129  After this, he 
“threatened the allies in October and November 1994 that he would lift the arms embargo,” and 
the Europeans were quick to change their own policies and collaborate with the United States in 
bringing the war in Bosnia to an end.130 
 The policy which Clinton pursued was a ‘lift-and-strike’ policy which did not include the 
use of ground troops as was initially thought would be required in a unilateral venture.131  The 
UN already had peacekeeping forces in place, so it was proposed that the arms embargo first be 
lifted so that Bosnia could arm and defend itself.  This proposal had been pushed by Izetbegovic 
in Bosnia since the war first broke out.  The second proposal was to begin airstrikes against Serb 
positions to be continued indefinitely until the Serbs gave up their ground in the hills above 
Bosnian cities like Sarajevo which had been under siege for the entirety of the war.  Both of 
these proposals turned out to be successful actions.   
The airstrikes proved especially successful for a number of reasons.  Airstrikes at the end 
of the twentieth century were far different from those carried out in World War II.  
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Indiscriminate bombings were no longer acceptable as a means to achieve military success.  The 
very use of indiscriminate mortar fire by the Serbs against the civilian population in Bosnia 
helped to turn the international community against them.  Therefore, the U.S. and its allies had to 
consider the cost of collateral damage into their strategy.  U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Commander 
Michael Ryan was in charge of figuring out options to pursue in airstrikes at this time.  His plan 
took the name Operation Deliberate Force and it disclosed much about what modern warfare and 
peacekeeping had to take into account in determining what policies were both acceptable and 
implementable. 
 “Ryan’s target selection reveals much about how his mission, prior planning, and 
political constraints shaped his concept of operations.”132  The first of Ryan’s objectives was to 
end the siege of Sarajevo.  In order to achieve this objective, his secondary mission would be the 
specific targeting of military “forces and facilities that supported threats to the UN mission on 
the ground.”  With these objectives in mind, the final mission would be for Ryan to obtain the 
approval of the UN to proceed.133  After being approved, all military moves were to be observed 
closely to ensure that there could be no fallout over the situation.  This put great pressure on 
commanders like Ryan.  “Convinced that ‘every bomb was a political bomb…Ryan felt obliged 
to exercise such close control to minimize the risk of error,’ and ‘if mistakes were made, to 
ensure that they would be attributable to him—and to him alone.’”134  Despite immense pressure, 
Ryan achieved his goals.  Amazingly, the collateral damage was kept relatively low in Bosnia, 
setting a precedent for future actions in military engagements.   
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 One of the primary targets of the airstrikes was the supply lines of the Serbs.  This action 
was taken after looking at the successes other armies had achieved in dividing an enemy from its 
supplies.  For centuries this had been a successful ploy of militaries.  The military leaders would 
have understood that “suddenly deprived of its supplies of men and material, a conventional 
army at war risks defeat by its adversaries, precisely the situation that confronted the BSA 
leadership in 1995.”135  When their positions were finally attacked and their supplies cut off, they 
were presented with a situation they could not win. 
 The Serbs were simultaneously hit by a new offensive of Croatians and Bosnians.  “On 
August 4, the Croats struck against the Serbs in the Krajina, heading toward Bihac in an 
offensive called Operation Storm.  The Serb forces completely disintegrated and the Croat 
offensive became a major rout.”136  These forces succeeded largely due to U.S. training and the 
psychological lift that came of it.137  With massive precision bombing and vengeful Croatians 
and Bosnians now headed towards them, the Serbian leadership quickly decided to negotiate.  
The bloodshed was finally brought to an end, and the change in borders brought by the Croat-
Bosnian offensive made Dayton possible. 
Unfortunately, peace was only achieved after the complete destruction of the country and 
its people.  Every facet of Bosnia had been devastated by the war.  For one thing, most of the 
industries which had existed prior to the war breaking out were now rendered useless due to their 
need for spare parts from elsewhere in Bosnia and the other former republics of Yugoslavia.  “Of 
its 4.3 million inhabitants (1991 figure), 1.2 million were refugees in host countries and another 
1 million were internally displaced persons, not to mention the 250,000 estimated dead and 
missing, and the 200,000 wounded.”  Bosnian Muslims were almost entirely driven out of 
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eastern Bosnia which was now occupied predominantly by Serbs.  Most Serbs had been driven 
out of western Bosnia which was now largely Croatian and Muslim.  Croats were highly 
diminished in number in central Bosnia which now became primarily Muslim.  “Every major 
Bosnian city found itself devoid of a large part of its pre-war population or facing the prospect of 
partition (Mostar).”138  The future of Bosnia looked grim at best following the tragedies of the 
past four years.  Thus, it was little wonder that those who would now lead in the restoration and 
recovery of this broken nation had a momentous task ahead.  In addition, even in the wake of 
tragedy, Bosnia again became the victim to those of the international community who thought 
they knew best in the pursuit of peace. 
The Dayton Peace Accords 
Hindsight tends to give historical narrative a sense of inevitability.  But there was nothing 
predetermined about the outcome of the Bosnia negotiations.  In August 1995, when they 
began, it was almost universally believed that they would fail, as all previous efforts had.  
And we knew that if we failed, the war would continue.139 – Richard Holbrooke 
 
The war in Bosnia officially ended with the initialing of the Dayton Peace Accords on 
November 21, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio.  The documents were then signed in Paris on December 14 
of the same year.140  The agreement was made between the leaders of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (what remained of 
it).  The agreement was excellent for the peace it represented, but there were problems with the 
way in which it was pursued.  The largest problem presented itself in the fact that Tudjman and 
Milosevic were given a seat at the table.  “For two aggressors who had wrought untold misery in 
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Bosnia to be placed in such a position showed how flawed the 1995 settlement was.”141  Giving 
them a seat at the table gave credibility to their rules and revealed the international community 
and United States to be weak against aggressors.  The other side of this argument, however, was 
that Tudjman and Milosevic were the only leaders that could represent the opposing elements at 
this time with the only strong alternatives being other individuals that were just as guilty.  No 
one wanted Mladic or Karadzic at the negotiating table, or others like them, but they were the 
leaders of their respective constituencies so they had to be dealt with.  Regardless, the following 
year, elections were held which allowed for nationalist elites to come to power over individuals 
that truly valued democracy.  “Holding these elections in a demolished society, where the 
wounds of war were still fresh, revealed the poverty of vision and incoherence of the architects 
of Dayton and would store up endless trouble for the future.”142  The country and its government 
are still paying for this lack of insight. 
Rebuilding Bosnia 
After achieving peace and stability in the region, the international community next 
pursued its rebuilding.  The work of rebuilding Bosnia following the war bore its share of 
problems.  A clear bias emerged in the way in which the Western societies viewed how Bosnia 
and other nations should be shaped regardless of their history and culture.  Gallagher, a British 
historian with an emphasis in religion and conflict in modern Europe, summed up this approach 
best in his book The Balkans after the Cold War.  He said that “for good or for ill, Bosnia reflects 
the dominant approach to nation building, which consists of international support for a settlement 
between warring parties; help in setting up the country’s governing structures; and economic 
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assistance to restructure the state, financial institutions, and civil society.”143  This is the exact 
pattern that was used in Bosnia.  The United States and its Western allies set up the peace 
agreement at Dayton.  They then determined what form the government would take and held 
elections thinking more about immediacy than the long term effects of the elections’ outcomes.  
Finally, they continued to give economic assistance and political guidance.  What they failed to 
recognize was that the structure of their own nations might not be the ideal structure for the 
rebuilding of Bosnia or other formerly communist states.  Gallagher called this view by the West 
a “liberal internationalist world view” that made the assumption that future states would all look 
like their own “secular, democratic states.”  Thus, their goal for Bosnia and others like it was not 
just to rebuild the state.  Instead the Western powers would pursue the creation of “multiethnic, 
secular, and capitalist states” without regard to the “country’s past, its culture, or the 
particularities of recent history.”144   
By accepting that their states were the prime examples that others should be modeled off 
of, the international community denied the possibility to other nations of pursuing self-
determination despite all the differences they might have possessed or how difficult the journey 
might be towards creating such a state and society.  By doing so, they revealed themselves to be 
arrogant and incapable of finding the right solution for the future of Bosnia.  Until this arrogance 
can be resolved, this will continue to be a problem in state building. 
As a solution, McMahon suggests that “more attention should be paid to the similarities 
between Bosnia and other former Communist states and to what has helped these states move 
toward stability and democracy.”145  The United States is unique in its composition as are the 
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other Western nations with a history of democracy.  Democracy is an excellent system of 
government, but there cannot be one, and only one way of creating democracy and the ideals it 
represents when nation building.  Rebuilding without a thought as to the customs and traditions 
of the people in the nation being invested in exposes an arrogant view that the investor’s way of 
doing things is in all ways superior to the national models.  As the world becomes more 
globalized, and the more powerful countries and international bodies like the U.N. continue to 
intervene in the affairs of the less powerful, there must be a movement towards learning about 
and appreciating the differences other cultures possess.  Future policy must not be shaped by 
politicians alone, but also by city and regional planners and those in the liberal arts who have 
invested time and energy in understanding the customs and cultures that are being affected. 
Lessons for the Future 
 
 Justice is a popular word in politics today.  Politicians tout it as a cornerstone of their 
campaigns.  College campuses, like Cal Poly, host events which encourage dialogue about social 
justice issues.  News agencies report daily the wrongs being committed around the world.  Even 
Hollywood has taken part in the move for justice by making movies focusing on actual tragedies 
which have occurred (Hotel Rwanda), or making their audience aware of issues like racism 
which continue to exist in our society today (Crash).  Talk of justice and injustice is all around, 
however the ability to internationally intervene in conflicts where injustices are taking place is a 
bureaucratic nightmare.  The Bosnian War was the source of numerous injustices at the end of 
the twentieth century.  The response by those who charged themselves with bringing justice to 
the situation was slow at best, and thousands of people died as a result of this sluggish response.  
Thus it is necessary to understand that the positive outcomes of the international effort to end the 
war should not overshadow the atrocities that came before it.  The Bosnian War is a part of 
69 
 
history now, and it is a history which must be learned from in order to ensure it does not happen 
again. 
 The most significant lesson which must be taken from the Bosnian War is that inaction 
and ignorance can be as damaging as taking sides, if not more so.  Once the international 
community took a role in negotiating a peace, they became responsible, at least in part, for what 
would follow.  By then declaring neutrality in the matter, they eliminated their ability to dissuade 
aggression or even find an aggressor.  Thus, the war was allowed to escalate.  There were 
reasons for not wanting to get involved—Balkans as powder keg of Europe, fear of new 
Vietnam, was a civil war, ancient hatreds, etc.  However, it would have been morally repugnant 
to stand back and let the people of the Balkans just kill each other off, even more so with the 
presence of genocide. 
 Another lesson to be learned is that the eradication of injustice requires that risks be 
taken.  The Bosnian War ended at Dayton because the U.S. took a risk.  More risks like this must 
be taken in the future.  In order to accomplish this, politicians and others in positions of influence 
must begin pursuing and fighting for what is right more often than what is merely popular at the 
time.  This is understandably difficult, especially in a democracy where public opinion can make 
or break a career, but Clinton and the negotiators at Dayton made choices which resulted in 
ending genocide in Bosnia.  And ending genocide and other crimes against humanity are always 
worth the risk.  The greatest risk taker, Holbrooke, fought for and pursued the peace process 
through to its end only to be rejected by the administration following Dayton, but he helped save 
generations of Bosnians in the process and is the hero of this story in history.   
Since November 21, 1995, “Dayton” has entered the language as shorthand for a certain 
type of diplomacy—the Big Bang approach to negotiations: lock everyone up until they 
reach agreement…Those considering other Daytons should proceed with caution.  It is a 
high-wire act without a safety net.  Much work must precede the plunge into an all-or-
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nothing environment.  The site must be just right.  The goals must be clearly defined.  A 
single host nation must be in firm control, but it is high risk for the host, whose prestige is 
on the line.  The consequences of failure are great.  But when the conditions are right, a 
Dayton can produce dramatic results.146 
 
Hopefully more Daytons are on the horizon for ending future conflicts.  No situation will ever be 
just like Bosnia again, however the risk and determination of the leaders at Dayton proved that 
even complex conflicts can eventually end in peace, even if that peace is tenuous. 
The massacre which took place at Srebrenica might have looked different had leaders 
been willing to take a risk.  The troops on the ground bore some responsibility, but the greater 
issue was the lack of commitment on the part of their leaders in the UN.  The number of troops 
which were initially sent represented a lack of will on the part of the international community to 
send a message that aggression would not be tolerated.  By pulling out of the safe zone they sent 
an even clearer message that they could be pushed around as the UN placed more value on its 
troops than the Bosnian civilians being murdered.  Instead, Sadkovich determined that “after 
appropriating the crisis and containing the violence, the West let the Yugoslavs rot.”147   
 A specific lesson for historians is that studies of the past should not distract from the 
significance of current events.  Historians failed the people of Yugoslavia as a whole by not 
speaking out before and after the war broke out.  Investigating the role of historians in 
Yugoslavia, historian Norman M. Naimark was shocked by how “most historians of the region 
retreated from active commentary on events” despite knowing the most about its past, present, 
and future.148  Historians already have a difficult job in remaining free from bias in their 
research.  However, as the most educated on the past of these areas they had the responsibility to 
speak out and warn of what had come before and could be again.  Knowledge and interest in the 
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past should not make one unaware or disinterested in the present and future.  Historians 
oftentimes are at their best when they can interpret the past in order to better understand the 
present and educate and inform others that will impact the future.  The international community 
could have benefited from such voices prior to making decisions.   
Another lesson for policy makers in the future will be to surround themselves with 
individuals that have knowledge of the histories and cultures of the people their decisions will 
affect.  The world is a diverse place made up of even more diverse people.  Understanding and 
appreciating the differences that exist between one’s own culture and those of others will lead to 
healthier interactions between people.   
The final lesson is that the United States and other Western powers must humble 
themselves by admitting that their way of doing things is not always the best model.  Bosnia 
suffered, and continues to suffer, in part because of the arrogance of the U.S. and UN.  By failing 
to acknowledge Bosnia’s history or culture as a relevant part of the process, the international 
community responded slowly to the collapse of Yugoslavia and next pursued a biased agenda in 
terms of how they saw the country being put back together after the war.  Future state-building 
efforts must take into account the differences that other countries possess.  In doing so, it will 
become possible to achieve stability more quickly as investigated and educated decisions are 
made.  Thus, it will be important for future generations of foreign policy makers to learn from 
the mistakes of their predecessors and approach future regional conflicts with sensitivity and a 
desire to learn from the groups involved.  However, they must also be prepared to act with 
firmness and take risks in leadership if they desire see their actions achieve success. 
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Conclusion 
Despite never resolving the grievances of World War II, Yugoslavia had made great leaps 
towards peaceful coexistence in a heterogeneous state.  “Yugoslavia’s 1981 census recorded 
about 640,000 ethnically mixed marriages, often made between Serbs and Croats despite the 
hostilities that have dominated relations between the two groups for decades”149  Yet this seemed 
to matter little to individuals like Tudjman, Milosevic, and other leaders in the republics who 
saw the world around them as they wanted to.  While still in the diplomatic stage of 
disagreement Tudjman insisted that “we have had enough experience to show us that no other 
form of government can exist here because Serbs and Croats belong not only to two different 
nationalities, but to two different cultural spheres.”150  Statements like these reflected a posture 
of already having given up on coexistence.  The population dynamics of these republics reflected 
something more hopeful, however.  This would be the case even after war broke out.  When war 
spread to Bosnia, much of the ethnically diverse population suffered together.  “Close to 80,000 
Serbs shared the siege of Sarajevo with their Croat and Muslim neighbors.  Indeed, throughout 
the war thousands fought and died for the idea of a multinational, cosmopolitan, pluralist 
society—an idea Bosnia embodied for centuries.”151 
Unfortunately, once events have occurred there is nothing that can be done to change 
them.  The dissolution of Yugoslavia was not immediate, just as the war which spread to Bosnia 
did not begin overnight.  The progression towards war was a gradual one.  Even after war broke 
out, there was time for the international community to step in and respond.  Instead, the war was 
allowed to rage on for four years leading to thousands of lives being cut short.  Startlingly, 
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“genocide occurred after the Cold War; after the growth of human rights groups; after the advent 
of technology that allowed for instant communication; after the erection of the Holocaust 
Museum on the Mall in Washington, D.C.”152   
As the world continues to change, the UN, NATO, the EU, the U.S. and all other nations 
and collaborations of nations will have to change with it.  The timid way in which the UN, 
NATO, the EC and the U.S. acted did not fit the Bosnian War.  Different approaches must be 
taken when negotiations fail or stall, and the UN allowed too much time to pass before moving 
on to new and firmer actions against known aggressors.  That time is what allowed thousands of 
Bosnian citizens to die and revealed the UN to be weak and unwilling to act.  The U.S., and 
specifically the Bush and then Clinton administrations, became complicit to the UN’s inaction by 
not reasoning harder with those in charge in the UN, or more simply, not being interested enough 
to really care what was happening in former Yugoslavia.  Unilateral action would never have 
worked, and the U.S. and other countries have seen what can happen when they choose to take 
the burden entirely on themselves.  However, injustices were taking place with the full 
knowledge of the nations that held positions as peacekeepers in Bosnia, and they continued for 
nearly four years without significantly being checked.  Genocide again transpired on Europe’s 
soil, and the leaders of the intervening international bodies allowed it to happen.  Little appeared 
to have changed since the 1940s as international leaders again practiced appeasement when 
negotiating with determined men driving questionable agendas.   
In conclusion, the UN, NATO, and the U.S. failed to successfully bring about a swift end 
to the Bosnian War which allowed Europe to experience genocide once more on its soil.  Though 
prepared to intervene in regional conflicts and possessing the means to act with strength, the 
international community, especially its European members, lacked unity and the resolve to 
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punish the aggressors.  Thus, hostilities escalated without restraint, and the intervention was 
initially rendered impotent.  Changes in leadership, tactics, and the tragedy at Srebrenica 
eventually led to a strong, united international effort to turn back the aggressors and force a 
peace, but by that time hundreds of thousands were dead and millions were displaced.  The 
Dayton Peace Accords brought peace to the region, but the dream of heterogeneity in Bosnia had 
largely been crushed.  Therefore, the intervention in Bosnia was largely a failed effort with its 
only success being that it eventually ended the war. 
 Bosnia’s importance now resides in its place in history as an event which can be learned 
from in order to ensure that other such conflicts never happen again.  “The war in Bosnia took a 
terrible toll, both on the people of that small country and on the international institutions whose 
intervention efforts were so problematic.  Nothing can change that history.  But by better 
understanding what happened, and specifically by bringing the tools of science to bear (in 
addition to the more common methods of journalism and history), we hope to contribute to the 
better management of future regional conflicts.”153  Sadly, mistakes have continued to be made 
by both the U.S. and U.N. in recent years, and terrible tragedies continue to occur around the 
world, yet there is still hope for change.  More “Daytons” can come to pass.  If the nations that 
desire peace truly investigate the positive and negative realities of their decisions in the past and 
the history and culture of the places they continue to impact in an effort to move forward, then 
they will achieve more positive results in future engagements.  Perfection will never be 
achievable in resolving conflicts, nor should it be expected, but the humble pursuit of 
understanding those affected and where they have come from must become an integral part of 
policy making.  There is much still to learn from what occurred in the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
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and the Bosnian War, and perhaps a most sincere hope for those who make decisions is that they 
will begin to take responsibility for their actions and be willing to learn from the past and take 
risks for their future.  In reality, the Bosnian War is still influencing leaders’ ideologies when it 
comes to international bodies inserting themselves into national conflicts and it will continue to 
be used that way for years to come.   
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